WHEN DOES RESTITUTION BECOME
RETRIBUTION?
MELANIE REID* & CURTIS L. COLLIER**
I. Introduction
During a civil trial, a defendant is typically focused on one thing: “How
much money will this trial cost me if I lose?” The focus is quite different
for a criminal defendant: “How much time will I serve in prison if I am
found guilty?” Defense teams in both criminal and civil proceedings have
similar objectives, i.e., minimize any damages imposed against their clients.
However, in the scheme of things, financial loss is usually preferable to
prison or loss of liberty. For that reason, most people lose sight of the fact
that oftentimes a criminal defendant may face not only serious jail time but
also debilitating financial losses in the form of restitution to identified
victims. Restitution should be awarded to victims to compensate them for
their losses, but excess restitution is tantamount to unfair retribution.
Excess restitution has become particularly troubling in child pornography
cases when one victim’s image is illegally possessed or distributed by
multiple convicted criminal defendants. The result of duplicative restitution
is often unjust enrichment of victims, who are sometimes compensated
millions of dollars for one illicit image. This raises serious questions
regarding when and how justice is served through the restitution process
during criminal proceedings.
At the end of a federal criminal trial, if the defendant is convicted, the court
sentences the defendant to a term of imprisonment, imposes a standard term of
supervised release, and issues a $100 assessment/criminal monetary fine per
each count of conviction to be paid to the court.1 Yet, there is an unfamiliar
issue that increasingly arises at sentencing that touches upon the same
concerns as those facing a civil defendant: restitution.
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Criminal restitution, like civil liability, threatens a criminal defendant with
substantial financial loss. Despite the possibility of a large and at times unfair
restitution award, criminal defense attorneys and prosecutors rarely devote
adequate time to consideration of a third party’s request for restitution. This is
partially because, despite a growing body of statutory and case law addressing
restitution,2 criminal defense attorneys and prosecutors are not as familiar with
restitution determinations as are their civil counterparts. Additionally,
criminal defense attorneys and prosecutors focus on what they perceive to be
more immediate concerns such as guilt and innocence and the length of
sentence. Criminal prosecutors and defense attorneys are usually unfamiliar
with restitution determinations which apply more to civil remedies.
Restitution may be mentioned at the conclusion of a criminal trial, but this
issue is secondary to incarceration deliberations. Restitution is thus never at
the forefront of criminal proceedings.
What is restitution’s place in the criminal proceeding? English courts
first developed restitution centuries ago as a contractual remedy to prevent
unjust enrichment of one party over another.3 The United States brought
the concept of restitution to the court system and expanded its use to
contracts, torts, and criminal law.4 In criminal law, restitution is an
affirmative performance by the defendant that benefits the individual victim
affected by the crime.5 Restitution has many definitions. The one most
applicable to its use in a criminal proceeding is:
Return or restoration of some specific thing to its rightful owner
or status . . . [c]ompensation for loss; esp[ecially], full or partial
compensation paid by a criminal to a victim, not awarded in a
civil trial for tort, but ordered as part of a criminal sentence or as
a condition of probation.”6
In criminal proceedings, the sentence is meant to punish, deter,
incapacitate, and hopefully in some cases, rehabilitate the guilty.7
2. See Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, § 5(a), 18
U.S.C. § 3663 (2006); Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §
204 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §3663A (2006)).
3. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENEE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW 314, 888 (2009).
4. Id. at 853-54.
5. United States v. Wyzynski, 581 F. Supp. 1550 (E.D. Pa. 1984); FRANK W. MILLER,
ROBERT O. DAWSON, GEORGE E. DIX & RAYMOND R. PARNAS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
ADMINISTRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1222 (Foundation Press, 5th ed. 2000).
6. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1428 (9th ed. 2009).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006).
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Restitution, however, introduces another important consideration to the
case. It is the only element of the sentence that focuses solely on the victim
and, as the definition states, is meant to restore the victim to his or her
original state before the crime occurred. As an example, imagine a
defendant who has been convicted of robbing a bank. The punitive aspects
of his sentence may include a term of imprisonment, supervised release,
and a fine. In order to make the victim of the crime whole, however, the
court may order the defendant to reimburse the bank for the whole amount
of money he originally stole. But if the purpose of restitution is to make the
victim of a crime “whole,” then it is not meant as additional punishment to
the defendant, but rather something akin to punitive damages in the civil
tort law context.8
A judge must decide the restitution amount to be awarded to the victim in a
criminal case. To accomplish this, a judge must consider whether the restitution
should focus on the gains the defendant has received from the crime or focus on
the victim’s losses as a result of the crime.9 The criminal court system can learn
from the civil court system’s time-tested approach to damages, compensation,
and restitution. The civil system employs the use of nominal, compensatory,
and punitive damages, general and specific damages, non-pecuniary and
pecuniary losses, and concepts such as joint and several liability and equitable
remedies to return victims to their state of being “whole.”10
Not every request for restitution is as simple as repaying the bank or
returning the stolen car to the original owner. Some crimes lend themselves
to a more complicated restitution decision from the judge, as this article
will show. The VWPA required that restitution be ordered as a separate
component of every sentence if requested.11 The MVRA amended the
codified statutes involving restitution, specifically 18 U.S.C §§ 3663 and
3664, adding that victims must be “directly and proximately” harmed by the
offense and that each victim is entitled to the “full amount of each victim’s
losses.”12 However, it was the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),
passed in 1994, that guaranteed restitution for certain title 18 offenses, such
8. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1063 (2000).
9. In other words, should the victim receive the value of whatever was conferred to the
defendant as a result of the crime or should the victim’s compensation come from the loss
the victim has suffered as a result of the defendant’s unlawful act?
10. FED. R. CIV. P. 32. Civil damages are typically determined by a jury whereas
criminal restitution awards are determined by the judge.
11. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-3664.
12. Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2006)).
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as violence against women, sexual abuse, sexual exploitation of children,
domestic violence and telemarketing fraud.13 This article specifically
explores federal court orders of restitution entered against defendants
convicted of possessing child pornography—intended to help make victims
of sexual abuse and exploitation whole.14
Fifteen years after the passage of the VAWA, victims of child
pornography began to request restitution from those convicted of
possessing, receiving, or distributing child pornography in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2252 and 2252A.15 Congress made restitution for victims of
child exploitation offenses, in particular possession of child pornography,
mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 2259.16 An order of restitution under § 2259
“shall direct the defendant to pay the victim . . . the full amount of the
victim’s losses as determined by the court.”17 This statute confronted
judges with a multitude of issues: who are the “victims,” how can they be
restored to their original state prior to the offense, and should they be
compensated for their loss or should the focus be on the defendant’s gain by
having unlawful images in his possession?
Since 2009, few victims have requested restitution under 18 U.S.C. §
2259—most restitution requests have come from two victims, known only
as “Amy” and “Vicky.”18
“Amy” and “Vicky have requested

13. Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 18 U.S.C. § 3663
(2006).
14. See also Robert William Jacques, Note, Amy and Vicky’s Cause: Perils of the
Federal Restitution Framework for Child Pornography Victims, 45 GA. L. REV. 1167
(2011); Michael A. Kaplan, Note, Mandatory Restitution: Ensuring That Possessors of Child
Pornography Pay for Their Crimes, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 531 (2011); Dina McLeod, Note,
Section 2259 Restitution Claims and Child Pornography Possession, 109 MICH. L. REV.
1327 (2011); Jennifer Rothman, Note, Getting What They Are Owed: Restitution Fees for
Victims of Child Pornography, 17 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 333 (2011).
15. In most of the cases discussed below, the defendant is charged with knowingly
possessing material that contained images of child pornography which had been transported in
interstate commerce by means of computer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) or §
2252(a)(4)(B). There is a mandatory minimum sentence of five years for distribution or receipt
of such materials and a maximum of twenty years under these statutes. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b).
16. Id. § 2259.
17. Id.
18. “Amy” is also referred to as the child in the “Misty” child pornography series. “A
‘series’ is a collection of child pornography images depicting the same victim or victims;
they are traded online among those who deal in child pornography.” United States v. Hardy,
707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 600 n.3 (W.D. Pa. 2010). “Amy” and “Vicky” have been used in court
documents to protect their privacy.
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$3,367,854.00 and $151,002.91, respectively, in multiple cases.19 “Amy”
has requested restitution in 684 cases of possession, receipt, or distribution
of child pornography, and in a survey of 116 of those cases from multiple
judicial districts, she has been awarded a total of $11,939,821.00.20
“Vicky’s” images are, unfortunately, associated with as many as 9200 cases
around the country.21 In a survey of 153 cases in which “Vicky” has sought
restitution, “Vicky” has been awarded a total of $2,739,145.50.22 The
paperwork from the victim’s attorney is the same in each case, simply
replicated for the new defendant, forwarded to the prosecutor, the federal
district court, and defendant’s attorney, regardless of the jurisdiction in
which the case is being adjudicated. Some courts request additional
information while others are satisfied with the dollar amount requested
without further information. The decisions by the federal district court
judges are not the same however. In some cases, the court has awarded the
entire amount requested by the victim.23 In other cases, the courts have
declined to order any type of restitution, typically because the court found
no quantifiable loss that was proximately caused by the defendant’s offense
of conviction.24 Still other courts have decided that the victim should
19. Because of the nature of child pornography, images of a particular child will occur
in many cases. The names “Amy” and “Vicky” appear in a large number of child
pornography cases. See, e.g., United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(using “Amy”); United States v. Patton, No. 09-43 PAM/JSM, 2010 WL 1006521 (D. Minn.
Mar. 16, 2010) (using “Vicky”); United States v. Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d 182, 185 (D. Me.
2009) (using “Amy” and “Vicky”).
20. United States v. Monzel, 641 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 2011) petition for cert. filed, 2001
WL 2877874, at *24 (U.S. July 15, 2011) (No. 11-85); see also Restitution Chart by Victim
(May 12, 2011) (on file with authors) (surveying 116 of “Amy’s” cases in which she
requested restitution; these restitution amounts reflect the amount awarded and not the actual
amount received by the victim).
21. United States v. Brannon, No. 4:09-CR-38-RLV-WEJ, 2011 WL 2912862, at *9
(N.D. Ga. May 26, 2011).
22. See Restitution Chart by Victim, supra note 20 (surveying 153 of “Vicky’s” cases in
which she requested restitution; these restitution amounts reflect the amount awarded and
not the actual amount received by the victim).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Baxter, 394 F. App’x 377, 379 (9th Cir. 2010) (awarding
$3000, the entire amount the government had requested); United States v. Staples, No. 0914017-CR, 2009 WL 2827204, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2009) (awarding “Amy”
$3,680,153); United States v. Freeman, No. 08-cr-00022-002, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
113942 (N.D. Fla. filed Aug. 5, 2009) (awarding to “Amy” $3,263,758).
24. United States v. Covert, Criminal No. 09-332, 2011 WL 134060 at *9 (W.D. Pa.
Jan. 19, 2011); United States v. Rhodes, No. CR-10-14-M-DWM, 2011 WL 108951, at *3
(D. Mont. Jan. 12, 2011); United States v. Rowe, No. 1:09CR80, 2010 WL 3522257, at *6
(W.D. N.C. Sept. 7, 2010); United States v. Chow, 760 F. Supp. 2d 335, 345 (S.D.N.Y.
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receive a percentage of the total loss and have typically awarded between
$3,000 and $5,000 as the amount of harm caused by the possessor of the
child pornography.25 There have also been a few cases in which the
government and the defendant have stipulated to a restitution amount,
taking the decision out of the hands of the judge.26
The wide variety of judicial decisions make clear that judges are
confused as to the method of calculation of restitution owed to victims of
child pornography. Title 18 U.S.C. § 2259, as written, is broken and must
be fixed. Such action is required to provide clarity to sentencing judges,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys, and to compensate the victim
effectively while instilling a sense of fairness and justice in the issuance of
an order to the defendant to pay the restitution.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part II examines the 18 U.S.C. §
2259 restitution statute in detail in relation to the child pornography
possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(5)(B). This part describes the
issues facing defense attorneys and prosecutors alike as they tackle § 2259
2010); United States v. Faxon, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1361 (S.D. Fla. 2010); United States v.
Solsbury, 727 F. Supp. 2d 789, 796-97 (D. N.D. 2010); Patton, 2010 WL 1006521 at *2;
United States v. Woods, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1113 (N.D. Iowa 2010); United States v. Van
Brackle, No. 2:08-CR-042-WCO, 2009 WL 4928050, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 2009);
United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 792 (E.D. Tex. 2009); United States v.
Simon, No. CR-08-0907 DLJ, 2009 WL 2424673, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2009); United
States v. Johnson, CR 08-218-01-KI (D. Or. May 19, 2009); Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 188.
25. United States v. McDaniel, 631 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Ontiveros,
No. 2:08-CR-81-JVB, 2011 WL 2447721 (N.D. Ind. June 15, 2011) (awarding 1% of losses or
$4,500 in restitution); United States v. Lindauer, No. 3:10-cr-00023, 2011 WL 1225992, at *4
(W.D. Va. Mar. 30, 2011) (awarding 5% of total losses or $5,448 in restitution); United States v.
Mather, No. 1:09-CR-00412 AWI, 2010 WL 5173029, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2010)
(awarding $3,000); United States v. Brunner, No. 08-CR-16, 2010 WL 148433, at *5 (W.D.
N.C. Jan. 12, 2010) (awarding $6000 to “Amy” and $1500 to “Vicky”); United States v. Hicks,
No. 1:09-cr-150, 2009 WL 4110260, at *5-6 (E.D. Va. Nov. 24, 2009) (awarding $3000);
United States v. Elhert, No. 3:09-CR-05203, judgment at 7-11 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 13, 2009)
(awarding $1000 and $5000 to victims respectively for the number of images in defendant’s
possession); United States v. Brown, No. 2:08-cr-1453-RGK-1, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113942 at *1
(C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 5, 2009) (awarding $5000); United States v. Ferenci, No. 1:08-CR-0414
AWI, 2009 WL 2579102, at *6-7 (E.D. Cal. filed Aug. 19, 2009) (awarding $3000); United
States v. Monk, No. 08-cr-0365 AWI, 2009 WL 2567831, at *6-7 (E.D. Ca. filed Aug. 18, 2009)
(awarding $3000); United States v. Zane, No. 08-cr-00369 AWI, 2009 WL 2567832, at *6-7
(E.D. Ca. filed Aug. 18, 2009) (awarding $3000).
26. United States v. Lubiewski, No. 09-cr-447 (E.D. Mo. filed Feb. 18, 2010)
(“Vicky”); United States v. Traynor, No. 09-CR-00273 (D. N.J. Oct. 7, 2009); United States
v. Granato, No. 2:08-cr-198 (D. Nev. filed Aug. 28, 2009); United States v. Hesketh, 08-cr165 (Conn. filed Feb. 23, 2009) (“Amy”).
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restitution issues at the sentencing phase. The gray areas of 18 U.S.C. §
2259 are numerous: what constitutes a “victim” in a child pornography
case, whether the damages must be closely linked or the “proximate result”
of the defendant’s possession of the images, whether joint and several
liability should exist in this area, what must the victim do to support the
damage amount requested, and what are the due process concerns in
relation to imposing such a restitution order. As each issue is addressed, a
separate sub-section discusses possible solutions to issues faced by
prosecutors and defense attorneys when arguing for or against § 2259
claims and possible suggestions on how judges could more uniformly
handle these problems.
Part III proposes that Congress amend 18 U.S.C. § 2259 to provide
guidance and consistency throughout the judicial system. A system that
determines the full amount owed to victims in the first instance, sets forth
percentage guidelines by apportioning the defendant’s fault in relation to
other co-defendants, orders restitution based upon apportioned liability, and
permits victims to seek contribution from other co-defendants would allow
the court to fashion a just apportionment of damages to each possessor
faced with a restitution request. The conclusory sub-sections in Part II, the
proposals delineated in Part III, and Part IV’s conclusion have been written
solely by Melanie Reid to serve as suggestions and guidelines to be used by
practitioners, federal judges, or members of Congress.27
II. The Issues Facing Mandatory Restitution Under 18 U.S.C. § 2259
Initially, determining the basics of criminal restitution in federal criminal
cases seems rather straightforward. In fact, in a summary training outline
on restitution, Assistant General Counsel for the United States Courts,
Catherine M. Goodwin, spells out the five steps in determining specific
restitution amounts: (1) “identify the offense of conviction in order to
determine whether restitution is mandatory,” (2) “identify the victims of the
offense,” (3) “identify the victims’ harms caused by the offense,” (4)
“determine which harms (and/or costs) are statutorily compensable under

27. Judge Collier collaborated on Part II of this article in an attempt to educate and
acquaint practitioners and judges with the pitfalls and peculiarities of this issue. Any
advocacy or suggestions on policy issues are the opinions solely of co-author, Melanie Reid,
as Judge Collier takes no position on any suggested proposals addressed below.
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restitution,” and (5) “determine if the plea agreement broadens
restitution.”28
These five steps are easy to follow when awarding restitution in
traditional cases. For example, victims of a financial loss are easily
identified whether the victim is a burglarized bank or an investor who fell
for a Ponzi scheme. There may be litigation about the size of the loss or
whether the offender should pay interest on the loss, but conceptually there
is no real dispute about whether a tangible financial loss occurred. The
offender appreciates why he must restore the victim’s tangible financial
loss. In the substantial majority of cases, there is a direct link between the
offender and the victim. With mail, wire, and internet fraud cases, the
offender and victim might not have ever physically met, but there is still a
direct link between the offender and victim.
In contrast, only steps one and five appear to be relatively easy to
interpret in the child pornography context. It is clear that restitution is
mandatory pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2259 which provides that “the order of
restitution under this section shall direct defendant to pay the victim” and
that both the government and defendant can stipulate to a restitution amount
in a plea agreement.29 Restitution in child pornography cases differs from
tradition restitution payments, however, in several respects. First, it
difficult to identify who is a “victim” of the offense. Second, monetizing
victims’ harms can be challenging because of the inherently personal nature
of the harm. Third, it is unclear which harms are statutorily compensable as
to the particular defendant.
Child pornography cases thus depart from the traditional understanding
of restitution in a variety of ways. When the possessor of child
pornography enters a guilty plea, it is unlikely he realizes and appreciates
that his offense is such that he must financially restore someone. One of
the benefits of restitution in traditional cases is that the act of making the
victim “whole” brings home to the offender the harmfulness of his/her
actions, and this restorative act has deterrent value in and of itself. This
deterrent value is completely missing in child pornography cases. In fact,
the opposite effect may be present because offenders will think the order of

28. CATHERINE M. GOODEN, U.S, SENTENCING COMM’N, RESTITUTION IN FEDERAL
CRIMINAL CASES, SUMMARY TRAINING OUTLINE 4 (2001), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
Education_and_Training/Guidelines_Educational_Materials/trainnew.pdf.
29. The statutes governing the sexual exploitation of children are found under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2251-2258 (2006). The mandatory restitution requirement for these offenses is found at
18 U.S.C. § 2259.
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restitution is unjust due to the extremely large restitution award granted the
victim which could lead to non-acceptance of the fairness of the sentence.30
Another distinction, of course, is there will rarely be a direct link between
the victim and the offender (as will be discussed in Part II.B). The possessor
and the victim have almost certainly never met. Moreover, the victim and
possessor may be separated by great distances with the defendant being in the
United States and the victim in Eastern Europe or elsewhere. There is also a
separation of time. The victim’s photograph may have been taken many years
ago and just recently accessed and possessed by the defendant. The last
distinction is that the types of losses listed in § 2259 are not the types of
injuries or damages recognized in typical restitution cases. Bernard Madoff’s
Ponzi scheme doubtless led to victims experiencing psychiatric or
psychological injury when they learned their life savings were gone and they
were destitute. However, the consequential damages found in child
pornography possession cases are generally not part of typical restitution
litigation or awards in federal court.31
30. See infra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
31. Most restitution cases require the defendant to restore any gains he or she made in the
process of committing the crime. DOBBS, supra note 8, at 1047. Child pornography restitution
cases are rather unique because they focus on the victim’s losses rather than any gains made by
the defendant. Focusing on the victim’s losses would lead one to believe the term “damages”
would also apply. However, the terms “losses” and “damages” are not synonymous. Damages,
which “refers to the monetary award for legally recognized harm,” is “distinct from restitution.”
Id. “Loss” is defined as “[a]n undesirable outcome of a risk; the disappearance or diminution of
value, usually in an unexpected or relatively unpredictable way.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1029 (9th ed. 2009). “Damages” is defined as “[m]oney claimed by, or ordered to be paid to, a
person as compensation for loss or injury.” Id. at 445. In tort law, damages can include nonpecuniary losses for physical pain and suffering, mental or emotional distress, fright and shock,
anxiety about the future, loss of peace of mind, happiness, mental health, humiliation,
embarrassment, or loss of dignity, loss of the ability to enjoy a normal life, inconvenience, etc.
Title 18, § 2259 of the U.S. Code muddies up the water by referring to “losses” incurred by the
victim and includes items that are covered under civil damages such as medical services, lost
income, attorney’s fees, and any other general losses which are all usually covered in civil
damages. However, it is imperative to remember restitution (a victim’s recovery of losses) was
not necessarily meant to cover everything one is entitled to under civil damages (such as pain
and suffering, mental or emotional distress, etc.). For example, if an end-user sports bar pirated
cable channels from Direct TV, Direct TV would ask for restitution in the amount of profit lost
those months the end-user watched the pirated channels. See generally Anti-Fraud Enforcement
Actions: The Truth, http://hackhu.com/news_archive.php. Direct TV would not include pain and
suffering as part of their losses. Even if the “victim” was an actual person rather than an
inanimate entity such as Direct TV, emotional damages would not be considered “losses” under
the general restitution statutes. Those emotional damages would only be covered in a civil suit
and not considered during a criminal restitution hearing.
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From this complex perspective, everyone involved in a child pornography
possession case must look at restitution with a completely new and different
mindset. The defense attorney must put out of his or her mind much of what
they knew or thought they knew about restitution in federal sentencing.
Further, unlike typical restitution cases where restoring the victim is the
purported intent, the unstated goal in child pornography cases is punitive,
not restorative. Much of what would be considered as a mitigating factor
against restitution in other cases is not present in child pornography cases.
Foremost, it is irrelevant whether the offender has the ability to pay
restitution because restitution awards are lifetime obligations. This means
in some child pornography cases the defendant will be saddled with a very
large restitution order that the offender will most likely never be able to pay
and no one will ever be able to collect.32 It is therefore helpful in this
context to think of restitution more in the nature of a criminal fine.
As a group, child pornography offenders are distinctive. Statistically, the
offender is a middle-aged white male, who, in possessing child
pornography, is committing his first offense.33 He has a solid work history,
and likely has at least a college education.34 Prior to his conviction, he has
been able to earn a decent salary, but after a criminal conviction and
lengthy prison sentence, his future earning capacity post-prison is dismal.35
It would behoove accused offenders in child pornography cases and their
defense attorneys to realize that the underlying intent of restitution in these
cases is not to make some victim whole but rather to punish the offender
further. With this realization, the offender has a better chance of mounting
a rigorous defense against unjust restitution. Indeed, child pornography
cases are the fastest growing type of case in federal prosecutions.36 While
these cases make up only about 2.3% of federal sentencing orders, this

32. This too explains why proximate cause is somewhat irrelevant and why each
offender must pay the “full amount of the victim’s losses.” 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3); see
discussion supra Part II.
33. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS,
http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2010/SBTOC1
0.htm; JANIS WOLAK ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, CHILDPORNOGRAPHY POSSESSORS ARRESTED IN INTERNET-RELATED CRIMES: FINDINGS FROM THE
NATIONAL ONLINE JUVENILE VICTIMIZATION STUDY 1-3 (2005), available at http://www.
missingkids.com/en_US/publications/NC144.pdf.
34. WOLAK ET AL., supra note 33, at 2-3.
35. Id. at 3.
36. Id.
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growth is larger than any other type of federal crime.37 More and more
practitioners will be facing these issues and be prepared to grapple with
them in the courtroom setting. The following sections A-E identify specific
issues facing practitioners in these types of cases.
A. Who Is Considered a “Victim” When the Offender “Merely” Possesses
Child Pornography?
1. The “Victim” Issue Identified
In order to request and receive restitution, a victim must suffer harm
from the offender’s conduct. Some defendants in child pornography cases
argue that the harm occurred when the image was created, and not when
viewed by the possessor, thereby negating the premise that the child is a
“victim” in the specific case of possession only.38 Those who feel they are
the “victim” and request restitution typically do so because they feel each
time the photograph or video is viewed, more harm is added to the initial
injury of being sexually abused.39 The child in the images may feel shame,
humiliation and fear that individuals, such as the defendant/possessor, are
watching these images, victimizing the child each time they are viewed.
The child is aware that his/her images were viewed because federal
prosecutors are required to notify potential victims that someone found to
be in possession of said images is being prosecuted.40
37. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. OFFENDERS IN EACH PRIMARY OFFENSE
CATEGORY fig. A (2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_
Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2010/FigureA.pdf; Fact Sheet: Project Safe Childhood, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.projectsafechildhood.gov/docs/factsheet.pdf (last visited June
16, 2012). The issues surrounding section 2259 of the child pornography restitution statute
have been raised in many federal courts recently. See United States v. Wright, 639 F.3d 679,
682 (5th Cir. 2011); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, [2010] SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl. 13 (15th ed. 2011).
38. See United States v. Woods, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1105-06 (N.D. Iowa 2010);
United States v. Patton, No. 09-43 PAM/JSM, 2010 WL 1006521 at *1 (D. Minn. Mar. 16,
2010); United States v. Church, 701 F. Supp. 2d 814, 819 (W.D. Va. 2010); United States v.
Chow, 760 F. Supp. 2d 335, 338-39 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); United States v. Brunner, No. 08-CR16, 2010 WL 148433, at *5 (W.D. N.C. Jan. 12, 2010); United States v. Van Brackle, No.
2:08-CR-042-WCO 2009 WL 492805,0 at *2-4 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 7, 2009); United States v.
Staples, No. 09-14017 CR, 2009 WL 2827204, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2009); United States
v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 785 (E.D. Tex. 2009); United States v. Hicks, No. 1:09-cr150, 2009 WL 4110260, at *5-6 (E.D. Va. Nov. 24, 2009); United States v. Berk, 666 F.
Supp. 2d 182, 185-86 (D. Me. 2009).
39. See infra note 67 (summarizing a typical victim statement).
40. Images found on a defendant’s computer as a result of a search warrant are typically
submitted to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) which
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The various restitution statutes differ in defining “victim.” The general
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, which is codified in 18 U.S.C. §
3663A(a)(2) and § 3663(a)(2), states that “the term ‘victim’ means a person
directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an offense
for which restitution may be ordered.”41 The VAWA restitution statute, 18
U.S.C. § 2259(c), states that “‘victim’ means the individual harmed as a
result of a commission of a crime under this chapter.” The requirement that
the individual must be “harmed as a result of the commission” of a crime
under § 2259 is a lesser standard than the “directly and proximately
harmed” requirement of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663 and 3663A, which address
general criminal restitution. It is logical to suggest that § 2259’s
requirement of “harm” rather than “direct and proximate harm” lends itself
to a broader range of “victims” than any other federal restitution statute.42
Defendants’ threshold argument that children found in photographic
images are not “victims” in child pornography possession cases has not
fared well. Most courts, even those that eventually deny restitution, have
found that the children in the images are “victims” harmed as a result of the
maintains a collection of images of child pornography made using known, real children
under the age of eighteen. See Child Victim Identification Program (CVIP), NAT’L CTR. FOR
MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/Page
Servlet?LanguageCountry=en_US&PageId=2444 (last visited June 20, 2012). NCMEC then
identifies from their database any known children under the age of eighteen and forwards
this to the government. Id. Federal prosecutors must provide victims of crime with notice of
certain developments in their case. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(2) (2006). In child pornography
cases, only the victim who has requested notification of a found image will be notified via
the Victim Notification System (VNS). OFFICE FOR VICTIM ASSISTANCE, FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY VICTIMS BROCHURE, http://
www.fbi.gov/stats-services/victim_assistance/cpva (last visited July 31, 2012). The VNS is a
computerized system that provides notice both via regular mail and email. OFFICE FOR
VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM AND
WITNESS ASSISTANCE 13 (2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/olp/ag_guide
lines.pdf. Victims may then submit impact statements and request for restitution. Id. at 3233, 37-43. A victim is not required to request or participate in any phase of a restitution
order. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(g)(1). Sixty days before sentencing, the government attorney,
“after consulting, to the extent practicable, with all identified victims, shall promptly provide
the probation officer with a listing of the amounts subject to restitution.” Id. § 3664(d)(1).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 3663.
42. Title 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e) also states, “For the purposes of this chapter, the term
‘crime victim’ means a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the
commission of a Federal offense.” Id. § 3771(e). In another context, the Supreme Court has
discussed the need to pay close attention to any meaningful variation among similar statutes.
See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (giving weight to different
phrases used by Congress).
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possession/viewing, and that these children should be allowed to allege any
losses suffered as a result of the crime.43 Many courts cite New York v.
Ferber for support:
Sexual molestation by adults is often involved in the production
of child sexual performances. When such performances are
recorded and distributed, the child’s privacy interests are also
invaded . . . . [P]ornography poses an even greater threat to the
child victim than does sexual abuse or prostitution. Because the
child’s actions are reduced to a recording, the pornography may
haunt him in future years, long after the original misdeed took
place. A child who has posed for a camera must go through life
knowing that the recording is circulating within the mass
distribution system for child pornography.44
43. Chow, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 338-39; Church, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 820; Patton, 2010 WL
1006521, at *2; Van Brackle, 2009 WL 4928050, at *3; Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 789;
Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 188 n.5.
44. 458 U.S. 747, 758 n.9 and 759 n.10 (internal citations omitted); see also Ashcroft v.
Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 249 (2002) (“[T]he continued circulation itself would
harm the child who had participated. . . . each new publication of the speech would cause
new injury to the child’s reputation and emotional well-being.”). The Senate seemed to
quote New York v. Ferber, 535 U.S. 234 (2002), when discussing an amendment to
legislation on offenses of sexual exploitation:
Because the child’s actions are reduced to recordings, the pornography may
haunt him in future years, long after the original misdeed took place. A child
who has posed for a camera must go through life knowing that the recording is
circulating within the mass distribution system of child pornography . . . . It is
the fear of exposure and the tension of keeping the act secret that seems to have
the most profound emotional repercussions.
S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 14 (1996) (quoting Bill to Amend Certain Provisions of Law
Relating to Child Pornography and for Other Purposes: Hearing on S. 1237 Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Sen. Biden, Member, S. Comm.
on the Judiciary)); see also United States v. Santa-Cruz, 127 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2009)
(holding that possession of child pornography causes continuing injury); United States v.
Sherman, 268 F.3d 539, 547 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The possession, receipt and shipping of child
pornography directly victimizes the children portrayed by violating their right to privacy,
and in particular violating their individual interest in avoiding the disclosure of personal
matters.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Tillmon, 195 F.3d 640, 643 (11th Cir. 1999)
(stating that “the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 2252 made clear that the primary
objective of the provision was to lessen the harm suffered by children”); United States v.
Hibbler, 159 F.3d 233, 237 (6th Cir. 1998) (“children depicted in the child pornography
distributed and possessed by a defendant who are the primary victims . . . .”); United States
v. Boos, 127 F.3d 1207, 1211 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he legislative history, when viewed in its
entirety, confirms the conclusion that the primary ‘victims’ that Congress sought to protect
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The Fifth Circuit has also addressed the concern as to whether a child
found in images possessed by the defendant was a “victim” under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2259 and entitled to restitution.45 The court has explained that the
possessors provide an economic incentive for the creation of the images,
thereby keeping the child’s images in circulation: “The consumer who
‘merely’ or ‘passively’ receives or possesses child pornography directly
contributes to this continuing victimization therefore the recipient may be
considered to be invading the privacy of the children depicted, directly
victimizing these children.”46 Congress has also stated that a child found in
pornographic images is a “victim” because each possession/viewing is a
repetition of the sexual abuse.47
2. Conclusions
Based upon current judicial interpretation and congressional intent, a
defendant will likely fail in his argument that the child depicted in the
pornography the defendant possessed or viewed is: (1) not a victim within
the meaning of § 2259 or (2) not harmed by defendant’s conduct. The
victim will have the right to be heard at the defendant’s sentencing and/or
restitution hearing if his or her images were found on the defendant’s
computer or in his possession.48 Congress has placed great emphasis on the
victim’s rights after passing a series of victim witness protection and
restitution acts: 1982 (VWPA), 1984 (Sentencing Reform Act), 1994
(VAWA), 1996 (MVRA), and most recently the Justice for All Act of 2004,
so that no judge, defendant, or prosecutor could deny a victim’s day in
court.49
by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 2252, were in fact, the children involved in the production of
pornography.”).
45. United States v. Norris, 159 F.3d 926 (5th Cir. 1998).
46. Id. at 930.
47. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, §
501(1)(A), (2)(D), 120 Stat. 587, 623-24. Congress stated that
the illegal production, transportation, distribution, receipt, advertising and
possession of child pornography . . . is harmful to the psychological, emotional,
and mental health of the children depicted in child pornography and has a
substantial and detrimental effect on society as a whole. . . . Every instance of
viewing images of child pornography represents a renewed violation of the
privacy of victims and a repetition of their abuse.
Id.
48. 18 U.S.C. § 3664.
49. Title 18 U.S.C. § 3771, the Justice for All Act of 2004, also known as the Crime
Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA), amends the federal criminal code to grant crime victims
specified rights, including:
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B. Is the Defendant’s Act of Possession a “Proximate” Cause of the
Victim’s Harm?
1. The “Proximate” Cause Issue Identified
Next, the courts must then decide whether the defendant was a proximate
cause of the harm alleged by the victim. Causation is a tricky concept in
any law school torts class. And it is the most difficult argument the victim
must make when requesting restitution under § 2259. Was the possessor of
child pornography a proximate cause of a victim’s harm? If the answer is
yes, then the courts must decide if the possessor was a cause or responsible
party for all or only partial harm to the victim. While an alleged “victim”
may have little difficulty in proving some generalized harm based solely on
child pornography images of that individual being discovered on some
offender’s computer, it is another matter entirely to request and recover the
“full amount of the victim’s losses” from the particular possessor. The “full
amount of the victim’s losses” under § 2259 includes:
(A) medical services relating to physical, psychiatric, or
psychological care;
(1) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused.
(2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court
proceeding or any parole proceeding involving the crime, or of any release or
escape of the accused.
(3) The right not to be excluded from any such public proceeding, unless the
court, after receiving clear and convincing evidence, determines that testimony
by the victim would be materially altered if the victim heard testimony at that
proceeding.
(4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district
court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding.
(5) The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in
the case.
(6) The right to full and timely restitution as provided by the law.
(7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay.
(8) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s
dignity and privacy.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a) (West 2011) (emphasis added). Section 3771(c)(1) provides that
“[o]fficers and employees of the Department of Justice and other departments and agencies
of the United States engaged in the detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime shall
make their best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of, and accorded the rights
described in [CVRA].” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1). “The crime victim or the crime victim’s
lawful representative . . . may assert the rights described in [the CVRA]” Id. § 3771(d)(1).
Under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA), the Financial Litigation Unit of the
United States Attorney’s Office collects the restitution for a period of twenty years from the
time of sentencing plus any incarceration time. 18 U.S.C. § 3663.
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(B) physical and occupational therapy or rehabilitation;
(C) necessary transportation, temporary housing, and child care
expenses;
(D) lost income;
(E) attorney’s fees, as well as other costs incurred; and
(F) any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result
of the offense.50
Judges must decide to award restitution based on the harm the victim
suffered as a result of either the defendant’s possession or if the defendant
is responsible for the “full amount” of losses suffered as a result of the
initial injury and additional victimizations each time the image was traded,
distributed, possessed and viewed. Defendants argue that there is a
proximate cause requirement between the victim’s losses and the particular
defendant’s conduct.51 Defendants further argue that they should only be
responsible for the additional harm of the image(s) being viewed and

50. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3)(A)-(F) (emphasis added). Interestingly, Congress did not
include embarrassment, humiliation, anxiety, loss of reputation, or loss of earning capacity
in the specified losses. These, in theory, are included in the “any other losses” category
which requires proximate cause.
51. Under tort law, proximate cause is concerned with policy considerations limiting the
scope of liability and the idea of remoteness and fairness in holding a defendant accountable
only for foreseeable consequences of his/her actions. DOBBS, supra note 8, at 450. If the driver
of a truck begins to type a text message on his cell phone and fails to see the traffic light has
turned red and hits an oncoming car due to his carelessness, the truck driver is liable as a
proximate cause of the other driver’s/victim’s injuries. However, should we hold the truck
driver’s mother liable for the accidents as well? But for the truck driver being born, this accident
would never have occurred in the first place, thereby satisfying the actual causation requirement.
Yet, the mother will undoubtedly not be held liable because of the proximate cause requirement - giving birth to a son who becomes a truck driver later in life is not an act in which a future
injury/car accident caused by her son would be reasonably foreseeable. The same policy
arguments as to proximate cause apply here; yet, in this scenario the possessor is not an innocent
third-party like the mother. The possessor of the child pornography would be similar to a rescue
worker who caused additional injury to the victim after the accident occurred. The producer of
the child pornography, similar to the truck driver, created the initial injury to the victim. See
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 250 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON TORTS § 41, at 264 (5th ed. 1984)) (“As a practical matter, legal responsibility must
be limited to those causes which are so closely connected with the result and of such significance
that the law is justified in imposing liability. Some boundary must be set to liability for the
consequences of any act, upon the basis of some social idea of justice or policy.”).
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possessed by that particular defendant, which is the only injury that was
foreseeable as a consequence of his conduct.52
More specifically, as applied to § 2259, it is unclear whether the term
“proximate result” that is found in section (f) refers only to “any other losses
suffered by the victim” or whether there is a proximate result requirement to all
the losses, including those stated in sections (a) through (e). This appears to be
the crux of most judges’ disagreement in determining the specific restitution
amount. In In re Amy, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the proximate cause
requirement is only applicable to “any other losses” in section (F) of 2259(b)(3):
“As a general proposition, it makes sense that Congress would impose an
additional proximate cause restriction on the catchall category of ‘other losses’
that does not apply to the defined categories. By construction, Congress knew
the kinds of expenses necessary for restitution under subsections A through E.
On the other hand, Congress could not anticipate what victims would propose
under the open-ended ‘any other losses’ subsection F.”53 Under the Fifth
Circuit’s interpretation, the victim would be entitled to recover all costs
associated with sections (A) through (E) without alleging the particular
defendant directly or proximately caused the harm, but rather by alleging
generalized harm (as discussed in Part II section A in relation to the term
“victim”). However, in the undefined “any other losses” catchall category in
section (f), the victim need allege how exactly the particular defendant caused
the “other” harm. Therefore, the inclusion of the phrase “proximate result” in
the last of the enumerated sections on types of losses means that such a
requirement is not needed for the other types of losses.54 The Seventh Circuit
appears to have agreed in United States v. Danser, when it stated: “[I]n enacting
52. United States v. Strayer, No. 8:08CR482, 2010 WL 2560466, at *10, *15 (D. Neb. June
24, 2010); United States v. Raplinger, No. 05-CR-49-LRR, 2007 WL 3285802, at *2-6 (N.D.
Iowa Oct. 9, 2007); In re Amy, 591 F.3d 792, 794 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Laney, 189
F.3d 954, 965 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 125 (3d Cir. 1999).
53. 636 F.3d 190, 198-99 (5th Cir. 2011). The Fifth Circuit also used the grammar
found in the statute to support its argument: “Here the statute does not present the types of
recoverable costs in a series, separated by commas. Instead, it begins a sentence (‘full
amount of the victim’s losses’ includes any costs incurred by the victim for—’) and then
lists six different endings for that sentence.” Id. at 199. The significance of the “doubledash” before the list of losses is that it separates each loss section from the other, and the
semicolons in between each loss section separates each section even further. Id.
54. The Fifth Circuit rejected the proposition that Porto Rico Ry., Light & Power Co. v.
Mor, 253 U.S. 345 (1920), controls when analyzing the grammatical structure of §
2259(b)(3). In re Amy, 636 F.3d 190, 199-200 (5th Cir. 2011). The Supreme Court stated
in Porto Rico that “[w]hen several words are followed by a clause which is applicable as
much to the first and other words as to the last, the natural construction of the language
demands that the clause be read as applicable to all.” 253 U.S. at 348.
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section 2259, it is clear that Congress intended to provide victims of sexual
abuse with expansive relief for the full amount of . . . [their] losses suffered as a
result of abuse. Congress chose unambiguously to use unqualified language in
prescribing full restitution for victims.”55
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Laney, held that
§ 2259 incorporates a requirement of proximate causation on all categories
of claims—that there must be a causal connection between the offense of
conviction and the victim’s harm.56 Other courts have agreed, determining
that the offense of conviction must be a “substantial factor” in the victim’s
losses,57 and that any loss suffered by a victim must be “a proximate result
of the offenses of conviction.”58 In United States v. McDaniel, the Eleventh
Circuit also determined that when using general principles of statutory
construction, a general proximate cause requirement should be read
backwards from (F) through the preceding sections (A)-(E).59
The District of Columbia Circuit, in United States v. Monzel, has
recently followed the Ninth, Third, and Eleventh Circuits’ lead in deciding
proximate cause is required in all categories specified in § 2259(b)(3)(A)(F) and not just in (F), basing its decision on “traditional principles of tort
and criminal law.” “It is a bedrock rule of both tort and criminal law that a
defendant is only liable for harms he proximately caused . . . nothing in the
text or structure of § 2259 leads us to conclude that Congress intended to
negate the ordinary requirement of proximate cause.”60
To further its argument that proximate cause applies in all categories of §
2259(b)(3), the D.C. Circuit found that the definition of “victim” in §
2259(c) that a person must be harmed “as a result of” the defendant’s
offense of possession “invokes the standard rule that a defendant is liable
only for harms that he proximately caused . . . [t]hat the definition does not
include an express requirement of proximate cause makes no difference.”61
55. United States v. Danser, 270 F.3d 451, 455 (7th cir. 2001).
56. 189 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251 (9th
Cir. 2011).
57. Crandon, 174 F.3d at 126.
58. Raplinger, 2007 WL 3285802, at *2; see also United States v. Pearson, No. 1:04-Cr340, 2009 WL 2383025, at *5-6 (N.D.N.Y. July 30, 2009) (entering a restitution order of
one-third the amount requested by the victim because only that amount was proximately
caused by the offense of conviction).
59. 631 F.3d 1204, 1208-09 (11th Cir. 2011).
60. United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 535-36 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
61. Id. at 536. The Court in Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 413, 421 (1990), stated
that the statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579, 3580 (2006), authorized restitution “only for the loss caused
by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction.” In Hughey, the defendant
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The Fifth Circuit counters by arguing that this definition of “victim” in §
2259(c) demands more of a general causation requirement than a proximate
cause requirement.62 The Fifth Circuit points to other restitution statutes,
such as 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A(a)(2) and 3663(a)(2), which define “victim” in
terms which would cause the reader to believe a specific proximate cause
requirement is necessary, in that the definition specifically states that the
“victim” be “a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the
commission of an offense.”63
District court judges differ as to whether a general proximate cause
requirement applies to all categories or just to the catch-all category (F). As
the district court judge in United States v. Monk, opined, “[t]he only
monetary figure provided to the court is the total amount of the victim’s
harm, not the harm Defendant Monk caused a particular victim.”64 The
judge found it difficult, if not impossible, to separate the amount of harm
caused by the defendant/possessor from the amount caused by other
possessors and in effect, required a proximate cause requirement in all
categories.65 Another judge in United States v. Berk determined that the
losses alleged were generalized and caused by the idea of the victims’
images being viewed by the public at large rather than caused by the
particular defendant having viewed their images.66 Since the losses alleged
were not specifically linked to the defendant’s conduct, nor was there any
mention as to what the impact was on the victims upon learning of the
defendant’s offense, the judge denied restitution.67 On the other hand, in
pled guilty to the misuse of one credit card, and the district court ordered the defendant to pay
restitution for only the “loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of
conviction.” Id. at 413. Thus, under the VWPA, “the government must show not only that a
particular loss would not have occurred but for the conduct underlying the offense of conviction,
but also that the causal nexus between the conduct and the loss is not too attenuated (either
factually or temporally).” United States v. Vaknin, 112 F.3d 579, 590 (1st Cir. 1997). Under the
MVRA, the First Circuit also ruled that there must be a clear causal link that “a particular loss
would not have occurred but for the conduct underlying the offense of conviction” and that the
link between the defendant’s conduct and the loss must not be “too attenuated.” United States v.
Cutter, 313 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting Vaknin, 112 F.3d at 589-90).
62. In re Amy, 636 F.3d 190, 198-99 (5th Cir. 2011).
63. Id. at 199 n.10 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e)).
64. United States v. Monk, No. 1:08-CR-0365AWI, 2009 WL 2567831, at *4 (E.D. Cal.
Aug. 18, 2009).
65. Id.
66. 666 F. Supp. 2d 182, 191 (D. Me. 2009).
67. Id. at 192-93. One of the victims in Berk told Dr. Silberg: “Everyday I have to live
in fear of these pictures being seen.” Psychological Evaluation by Dr. Joyanna Silberg at 4,
Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d 182 (No. 08-CR-212-P-S).
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United States v. Staples, the judge easily found the victim was specifically
harmed by the defendant’s possession of images depicting her sexual abuse
as a child.68
2. Conclusions
Does the proximate cause requirement only pertain to “any other losses”
in section F of § 2259(b)(3) as argued by the Fifth Circuit? Or is a finding
of proximate cause applicable to medical costs, lost income, and attorney’s
fees in sections A-E as it is to “any other losses”? “Amy” recently filed a
petition in the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari on this
very issue.69 This debate goes to the heart of what needs to be fixed in the §
2259 restitution statute. Thanks to legislative history and the Supreme
Court’s decision in Ferber, victims can easily connect a generalized harm
to each defendant’s conduct of possessing and viewing pornographic
images depicting the victim. Child pornography creates “a permanent
record of the children’s participation [in sexual activity,] and the harm to
the child is exacerbated by their circulation.”70 Thus, the generalized harm
would include the invasion of the victim’s privacy, the creation of an
economic motive to keep distributing the images, and the “new injury to the
child’s reputation and emotional well-being,”71 fear, and isolation as a
result of the additional viewing by the particular defendant.72
She fears the discovery of the pictures by her friends, but she also fears the
unknown and unnamed people who continue to be looking at these pictures of
her for their own perverse interests or to “groom” other children into these acts.
She feels continually violated when she contemplates these possibilities. As
Amy stated, “I don’t want to be there, but I have to be there and it’s never
going away, and that’s a scary thought.”
Id.
68. No. 09-14017-CR, 2009 WL 2827204, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2009).
69. Petition for a Writ of Ceriorari, Amy v. Monzel, No. 11-85, 2011 WL 2877874
(2011); see also Staples, 2009 WL 2827204, petition for cert. filed, (filed Mar. 11, 2011)
(No. 10-1132).
70. S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 18 (1996) (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759
(1982)). The Senate Judiciary Committee stated that “[c]hild pornography permanently
records the victim’s abuse [and] can cause continuing harm to the depicted individual for
years to come.” Id. at 8.
71. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 249 (2002).
72. Id. at 249 (2002) (“[A]s a permanent record of a child’s abuse, the continued
circulation [of child pornography] itself would harm the child who had participated. Like a
defamatory statement, each new publication of the speech would cause new injury to the
child’s reputation and emotional well-being.”); see United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 750
(3rd Cir. 1994) (finding that child pornography is an “affront to the dignity and privacy of
the child and an exploitation of the child’s vulnerability”).

2012]

WHEN DOES RESTITUTION BECOME RETRIBUTION?

673

A proximate cause requirement by all categories in § 2259(b)(3)(a)-(f)
would demand that the defendant only be liable for foreseeable consequences
and would require more than an allegation of generalized harm. According to
Black’s Law Dictionary, proximate cause is either “[a] cause that is legally
sufficient to result in liability; an act or omission that is considered in law to
result in a consequence, so that liability can be imposed on the actor” or “[a]
cause that directly produces an event and without which the event would not
have occurred.”73 In tort law, the concept of proximate cause is concerned
with policy issues limiting a defendant’s liability to risks the defendant
directly or foreseeably created.74 Courts have placed both a proximate cause
requirement on negligence claims and an actual causation requirement (in
which the plaintiff must prove that the defendant was the cause-in-fact of the
harm suffered by the plaintiff).75
In cases where the harm to the plaintiff is extremely widespread
involving multiple parties that contributed to the ultimate resulting injury or
where the magnitude of the injury is grossly out of proportion to the
defendant’s negligent conduct, the element of proximate cause is critical to
the judge’s analysis.76 Liability of the defendant must begin and end in
some logical form. A proximate cause requirement provides the judges
with a safety net so that just as in civil negligence cases, a criminal judge
can limit the defendant’s responsibility for the harm caused to the victim to
harms which are foreseeable. It is foreseeable that a possessor’s demand
for child pornography creates an economic incentive for the creation and
distribution of more child pornography. It is also foreseeable that the
defendant’s viewing of the victim’s images would invade the victim’s
privacy and exacerbate the victim’s initial sexual abuse. The sexual abuse
while filming or photographing the victim would not have occurred but for
the possessor’s demand for the images. Congress chose to write §
2259(b)(3) so that judges would take into consideration the total harm
suffered by the victim in the form of medical services, therapy or
rehabilitation, transportation, housing, child care expenses, lost income, and
attorney’s fees. There appears to be no limiting language, and therefore,
arguably no proximate cause requirement.77 The only explicit proximate
73. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 250 (9th ed. 2009).
74. DOBBS, supra note 8, at 448-50.
75. Id. at 447-48.
76. United States v. Church, 701 F. Supp. 2d 814, 830 (W.D. Va. 2010).
77. Title 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3) appears to differ from the VWPA causation standard.
The First Circuit stated in a VWPA case:
[W]e hold that a modified but for standard of causation is appropriate for
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cause requirement is found in the final category of “any other losses.”78 In
this category, Congress attempts to place limits on the potentially unlimited
circle of liability. If there are additional losses suffered by the victim, the
victim must show that these losses are foreseeable consequences flowing
from the defendant’s own conduct. The victim must show that she suffered
an additional loss particular to the defendant’s conduct above and beyond
what harm she had already experienced.
Determining that the defendant is responsible for the total harm, including
the initial injury to the victim and limiting the proximate cause requirement to
the “any other losses” category makes some sense. But for the possessor
soliciting the child pornography, the initial injury would not have occurred in
the first place, and the possessor’s demand feeds the supplier. The harm
suffered by the victim is intertwined in the possessor’s desire to possess and
view the images.79 Moreover, it would be extremely difficult to identify the
specific harm that a particular defendant caused by viewing the victim’s image
rather than looking at the total harm that the victim has experienced as a result
of the production, distribution, and possession of her images. But if the victim
chooses to request additional restitution amounts for pain and suffering,
humiliation, embarrassment, emotional distress, etc., the victim must
specifically tie these losses to the possessor’s conduct. This places a limit on a
victim’s losses and gives judges some discretion to decide what additional
restitution amounts are warranted.
The key issue to be determined here is the apportionment of liability.
Assume that the defendant, along with others, is liable for the total harm
caused to the victim because the court determined the victim’s alleged
losses were a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s actions. Should

restitution under the VWPA. This means, in effect, that the government must
show not only that a particular loss would not have occurred but for the conduct
underlying the offense of conviction, but also that the causal nexus between the
conduct and the loss is not too attenuated (either factually or temporally). The
watchword is reasonableness. A sentencing court should undertake an
individualized inquiry; what constitutes sufficient causation can only be
determined case by case, in a fact-specific probe.
United States v. Vaknin, 112 F.3d 579, 589-90 (1st Cir. 1997) (ordering restitution to the
bank only for outstanding fraudulent loans and not other loans owed that were not procured
by fraud), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Anonymous Defendant, 629 F.3d
68 (1st Cir. 2010).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3)(F).
79. However, this argument leaves out the role the distributor or redistributor plays in
the chain of responsibility. The distributor or redistributor is more active in meeting the
supply of child pornography, and thus is a more culpable character in creating the demand.
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the single defendant bear the total cost of the victim’s losses or merely a
portion?80
C. Should Apportionment Apply to the “Full Amount of the Victim’s
Losses” Under §2259(B)(3) When Multiple Offenders Are Involved, or
Should Each Offender Be Held Fully Liable?
1. The Joint Liability Issue Identified
Multiple parties contributed to the resulting harm to the victim in these
child pornography cases. Such persons include the producer of the images,
the distributors or re-distributors of the images, and criminal defendant who
possesses illicit images. In civil cases, once the defendant has been found to
have actually and proximately caused harm to the plaintiff (as well as other
co-defendants and/or non-parties to the lawsuit), the court must decide
whether the harm done to the plaintiff is divisible or indivisible.81 If the injury
is divisible, then the defendant is liable only for his share of the plaintiff’s
injury and the victim may recover from each wrongdoer the damages that said
wrongdoer caused.82 Conversely, if the injury is indivisible, then the jury does
not apportion liability amongst the wrongdoers because the defendants cannot
demonstrate what portion of the total damage he or she caused.83 Defendants
80. If the defendant is held liable only for the harm he/she caused the victim (and
therefore, the judge applied the proximate cause element to the total amount of harm alleged
by the victim), then there is no need to address this question. The defendant is then merely
held accountable for the injuries he specifically caused, and the argument in question C need
not be addressed. The judge in Berk found that the possessor’s viewing of the images was
not the proximate cause of a specific injury to the plaintiff. 666 F. Supp. 2d 182, 191-93 (D.
Me. 2009). If the victim was not aware that the defendant had viewed the images, then the
viewing could not result in harm to the victim which was later alleged as losses in
consideration for restitution. Id. at 191 n.8.
81. See JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS 201-03 (Lexis Nexis, 4th ed.
2010).
82. Id.
83. Dauenhauer v. Sullivan, 30 Cal. Rptr. 71, 74 (Ct. App. 1963) (“Appellants, on the other
hand, contend that the rule set forth in the cases cited by respondent is totally inapplicable when
the acts of the independent tortfeasors have united in causing one single and indivisible result
such as the destruction of appellants' house. We agree. In Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co. (1950)
35 Cal.2d 409, 433-34, 218 P.2d 17, 32, the court stated the rule as follows: ‘Where several
persons act in concert and damages result from their joint tort, each person is held for the entire
damages unless segregation as to causation can be established. Even though persons are not
acting in concert, if the result produced by their acts are indivisible, each person is held liable for
the whole. . . . The reason for imposing liability on each for the entire consequence is that there
exists no basis for dividing damages and the law is loath to permit an innocent plaintiff to suffer
as against a wrongdoing defendant.”); Piner v. Superior Court, 962 P.2d 909, 916 (Ariz. 1999)
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should always argue the injury to the victim is divisible so as to only be
responsible for the harm they specifically caused, though it may prove to be
difficult to separate the possessor’s injury to the victim from the actions of the
initial producer, distributors, and other possessors. More than likely, judges
will tend to find that the defendant is jointly and severally liable because the
injury to the victim is indivisible.84 The production, distribution, and
possession of each image combine to form a single, indivisible result. Each
defendant’s act (as the producer, the distributor, or possessor) is essential to
the victim’s overall injury. Since there are successive injuries to the victim
each time her image is viewed, it is impossible to determine which defendant
caused which injury (unless a particular defendant can adequately prove the
limit of his liability).85 In addition, there may be future defendants as yet
undetected (and thus not prosecuted) that have viewed or will view in the
future the images of the victim forever stored in the internet. This type of
scenario lends itself to joint and several liability. While the idea of holding the
defendant accountable for the entire financial loss amount appears to be unfair
to the possessor (in relation to the culpability of the producer or distributors),
the idea behind joint and several liability is that between the innocent injured
party and multiple responsible parties, the injured party should be made
whole. And that means the responsible parties should have to resolve their
relative shares among themselves by seeking contribution from each other.86
While § 2259 does not explicitly address this particular issue, § 2259(b)(2)
does refer to 18 U.S.C. § 3664 as guidance in the issuance and enforcement of
a restitution order under § 2259. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(h) states that

(“[I]in an indivisible injury case, the factfinder is to compute the total damage sustained by the
plaintiff and the percentage of fault of each tortfeasor. Multiplying the first figure by the second
gives the maximum recoverable against each tortfeasor. This result conforms not only with the
intent of the legislature and the text of the statute but also with common sense.”).
84. In re Amy, 636 F.3d 190, 201 (5th Cir. 2011). However, in United States v. Monzel,
641 F.3d 528 (D.C. Cir. 2011), the court found joint and several liability did not apply
because the court found that 18 U.S.C. § 3664(h) did not apply to single defendant
prosecutions, citing United States v. McGlown, 380 F. App’x. 487, 490-91 (6th Cir. 2010)
and United States v. Channita, 9 F. App’x. 274, 274-75 (4th Cir. 2001).
85. The injury suffered by the victim is similar to Driver B hitting and causing injury to
X’s car while X was on his way to the auto body shop to fix his car after Driver A had hit and
caused injury to X’s car the day before. Unless Driver B can prove he should only be liable
for the front headlight damage and not the damage done to the back fender caused by Driver
A, Drivers A and B will be held jointly liable for X’s damages and are both responsible for
100% of the total damages. See DIAMOND, supra note 81, at 201-03.
86. United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 615 (W.D. Pa. 2010).
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[i]f the court finds that more than one defendant has contributed to
the loss of a victim, they may make each defendant liable for
payment of the full amount of restitution or may apportion liability
among the defendants to reflect the level of contribution to the
victim’s loss and economic circumstances of each defendant.87
Under tort law, once the plaintiff’s injury is determined to be indivisible, and
the court has determined which defendants constituted a substantial factor in
causing the indivisible injury to the plaintiff,88 the defendants are held jointly
liable, and the plaintiff can collect the full amount of damages from any one of
or combination of the defendants.89 The defendant who pays the plaintiff the
full amount of damages may seek contribution from the other defendants at a
later date.90 Hopefully, during the civil trial, evidence is presented so that the
jury may apportion fault among the defendants and so that the defendant who
pays the plaintiff will be able to seek an equitable contribution from the
remaining defendants based upon each defendant’s amount of fault.
2. Conclusions
The restitution process during any criminal proceeding should focus on
making the victim whole to the greatest degree possible while also being
fair to the defendant. The judge should first decide whether the defendant
was a substantial factor in causing the indivisible injury to the victim. If so,
the judge should determine the full amount of losses and apportion fault.
The defendant should then have the right to seek contribution from other
defendants (or alternatively, the victim is awarded only the defendant’s
apportioned damages and the victim must seek contribution from other
defendants). In this respect, the innocent party is “made whole” by being
awarded full restitution, but the actual burden of recovering the full
restitution amount may be the responsibility of either the victim or the
defendant. It is within the purview of the court to decide who should bear
the burden of seeking contribution from other defendants who are later
determined to be the producers, distributors, or possessors of the victim’s
images. It is important that either the victim or defendant has the ability to
seek contribution from other defendants because, in practical terms, the

87.
88.
89.
90.

18 U.S.C. § 3664(h) (2006).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIAB. § A18 (2000).
Id.
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defendant will be serving a very long prison term, and whatever assets he
had will have been used in defending himself or taken by the government.91
Therefore, not only should the defendant be held jointly liable, but severally
liable as well. The judge should apportion damages based on the defendant’s
specific share of liability. Child pornography producers may be more culpable
or just as culpable as a possessor depending upon the view of the judge.
Despite the fact that judges may disagree as to the exact apportionment of
damages in relation to the defendant in their particular courtroom, the idea of
apportionment would alleviate some of the unfairness inherent in holding the
defendant responsible for the full amount of damages. The percentage
apportioned to the defendant will serve a much greater purpose when the
defendant attempts to collect the entire amount of damages from the other
defendants (minus what his apportionment was deemed to be if permitted to
seek contribution).92 In a civil case, the jury apportions fault amongst all the
defendants and non-parties whether they are before the court at that time or
not. In this context, apportionment among all the defendants (and non-parties
not yet prosecuted) in one criminal case in one jurisdiction is not possible
considering multiple defendants in multiple jurisdictions contributed to the
victim’s indivisible injury. Some opponents of apportionment have made this
argument.93 However, it bears mentioning that apportionment in most
jurisdictions only applies to the defendant’s ability to collect from other codefendants and does not affect the victim’s collection of the full amount of

91. Part III argues that victims should be the party to seek contribution from past,
present, and future co-defendants because it is unrealistic to imagine defendants in any
numbers will be able to collect from other defendants.
92. Defendants in § 2259 restitution cases have argued that it would be virtually impossible to
track loss determinations and restitution obligations in § 2259 cases in other jurisdictions. If CEOS
tracks these types of cases, this information could be sent to defendants regarding future cases
related to the victim. The defendant would then only need to worry about receiving contribution
from other defendants after the defendant has paid his/her full apportionment of fault.
93. “The viewing of child pornography is often a solitary event,” and therefore, since most
child pornography cases involve a single defendant in a single case, apportionment should not
apply. Brief of National Crime Victim Law Institute (NCVI), The National Center for Victims
of Crimes, and the Victim’s Rights Law Center in Support of Restitution for Amy and Other
Victims of Child Pornography at 18, United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781 (E.D. Tex.
2009) (No. 6:08-CR-61). “It is impossible to make a proportionate division of the restitution
amount among an unknown number of unidentified future defendants that have and will
contribute to the victim’s loss.” Id. at 20. The NCVI believes that apportionment among the
multiple defendants is authorized when the defendants are currently before the court for
sentencing. Id. at 21.
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damages from the defendant.94 Therefore, the fact that not all the defendants
will be apportioned their amount of liability in one criminal case should not be
a reason to eliminate the requirement of apportionment altogether. Joint
liability protects the victim; the apportionment of fault protects the defendant
in a later contribution claim.95
D. What Evidence Is Needed to Support a Restitution Claim for Damages?
1. Evidence Issue at Restitution Hearings
In many of the § 2259 criminal restitution cases, courts have permitted
victims to allege their losses in the form of affidavits sent to the court,
prosecution, and defense. In some § 2259 cases, restitution is decided upon
the affidavits submitted while in others a hearing is held in which the expert
witnesses must testify as to their claims.96
These affidavits have generally included (1) a victim impact statement,97
(2) a psychological evaluation in which the psychologist or psychiatrist
explains that the victim suffers from various medical problems (including
sleeping issues and post-traumatic stress disorder, experiences fear, anger,
and shame as a result of her exploitation and engages in self-harming
behavior which requires past, present, and future therapy) and (3) a report

94. Defendants have argued that fashioning an order of restitution is so complicated and timeconsuming that it outweighs the need to provide restitution. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(3) (2006).
95. This applies if the defendant is required to seek contribution and not the victim.
Part III argues the victim should seek contribution.
96. At a restitution hearing in United States v. Staples, No. 09-14017-CR, 2009 WL
2827204, at *1-3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2009), three witnesses testified on behalf of the victim: a
detective in the case, who received an image of child pornography via the internet from the
defendant, the victim’s attorney, who outlined the basis for each amount requested, and a
psychologist with a Ph.D. in general child psychology, child sexual abuse, and traumatic stress
in children, who testified that the dissemination and possession of these images depicting the
sexual abuse caused additional harm to the victim and resulted in harm distinct from that
suffered from her actual physical sexual abuse. The government also entered into evidence
several exhibits to support the victim’s loss calculations such as tables that broke down the
present value of net wage and benefit loss and another table which analyzed the present value of
future treatment and counseling costs to create a total of $3,680,153 in damages. Id.
97. Victim impact statements describe victims' financial, physical, psychological, or
emotional damages; harm to relationships; medical treatments or mental health services; the
need for restitution; and, in some cases, victims' opinions of appropriate sentences. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 32(d)(2)(B). They are used in court to ensure that victims' voices are heard during
the criminal justice process. SART Toolkit, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS (Jul. 28, 2011),
http://ovc.ncjrs.gov/sartkit/develop/issues-vis.html.
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by an economist discussing the value of lost wages and benefits and the
reduction of the value of the victim’s life due to this exploitation.98
Some defendants have argued that § 2259(b)(3), which states that the
“’full amount of the victim’s losses’ includes any costs incurred by the
victim,” only applies to the victim’s past and present losses and not future
losses, such as the cost of future medical treatment and counseling.
Defense counsel may have a point—the clear language of § 2259 uses the
past tense in describing what losses are covered. Future losses could be
inferred as not included under § 2259 since the statute does not discuss
typical future loss requirements such as fixing a loss period99 or reducing
future losses to present value.100
Yet most courts, by awarding amounts that include future losses, have
apparently found that the words “costs incurred by the victim” does not limit
the victim’s damages to past losses but rather, have found “incurred” to be an
adjectival participle with no connotation of tense.101 This would seem to be in

98. For example, in United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 792 (E.D. Tex. 2009),
Amy submitted a victim impact statement, a psychological evaluation by a forensic
psychologist, and an economic report. The paperwork also included attorney’s fees and expert
witness fees so that the total losses alleged was $3,367,854. Id. A breakdown of this figure
includes $2,855,173 for lost wages and earning capacity, $512,618 for future treatment and
counseling costs, $16,980 in expert fees, and an unknown amount for attorney’s fees and other
costs. United States v. Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d 182, 191 n.7 (D. Me. 2009).
In Berk, Vicky submitted a forensic psychological evaluation completed by Dr. Randall
Green, a victim impact statement as well as a statement by her mother and stepfather, and “a
transcript of an internet chat that discusses ‘Vicky’ and her images.” Id. Vicky alleged
“$128,005 for future counseling expenses, . . . $19,497.91 for expenses, and . . . $3,500 in
attorney’s fees for a total of $151,002.91.” Id.
99. In tort law, “[w]hen the plaintiff claims that she will suffer losses in the future, she
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that those losses will in fact be incurred in
the future. She must also prove duration. If she will endure pain for the rest of her life, the
trier must have some basis for estimating her life expectancy. If her injury is permanent and
will never allow her to work, the trier must have some basis for estimating how long the
plaintiff would have worked if she had not been injured. Such periods may be very long,
easily thirty or forty years in some cases.” DOBBS, supra note 55, at 1056-57. In child
pornography cases, rarely has a victim been asked to provide more than an affidavit from a
statistician to prove life expectancy and work estimates had she/he not been injured and an
affidavit from a psychiatrist or a psychologist to determine future medical and therapy needs.
100. In tort law, “[c]ourts have said that damages awarded for losses that will occur in
the future should be reduced to present value.” Id. at 1057.
101. The damages award may encompass future losses if estimated with reasonable
certainty. United States v. Pearson, No. 1:04-CR-340, 2009 WL 1886055 at *2-3 (2d Cir.
July 2, 2009); United States v. Doe, 488 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v.
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line with congressional intent given that the victims will be young children,
and many of the losses, such as lost wages, will not fully manifest until
adulthood. If criminal restitution damage calculations were to mimic tort law
damage calculations, the victim’s future need for medical care and associated
costs as well as the victim’s future lost wages would almost always be
recoverable as they are in civil suits (as long as sufficiently proved).
While hearsay is permissible during a sentencing hearing, the information
presented to the court must contain a “sufficient indicia of reliability.”102
However, hearsay presented at most sentencing hearings consists of information
intended to persuade a judge to sentence a defendant to a lower or higher
sentence depending upon which party is introducing the evidence. The stakes in
restitution cases are as high or even higher than sentencing considerations
because the judge has to make a total loss calculation similar to the one made by
juries in civil courts. Those juries receive a wealth of information and testimony
prior to making a final damage determination. Plaintiffs in civil suits are
required to spend a significant portion of the trial proving specific damages,
property damages, personal injury damages (including medical expenses, lost
wages or diminished earning capacity, a reduction to “present value,” and pain
and suffering), and punitive damages, by presenting evidence in the form of
expert and witness testimony.103 This testimony at trial is considered during
Danser, 270 F.3d 451, 455 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Julian, 242 F.3d 1245, 1248
(10th Cir. 2001).
102. United States v. Robinson, 898 F.2d 1111, 1115-16 (6th Cir. 1990) (“The district
court may consider hearsay evidence in determining sentence, but the accused must be given
an opportunity to refute it, and the evidence must bear some minimal indicia of reliability in
respect of defendant's right to due process.” (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 765 F.2d
1546, 1555 (11th Cir.1985); United States v. Otero, 868 F.2d 1412 (5th Cir.1989)).
103. While medical expenses may be easy to establish, lost wages and pain and suffering
may prove to be much more difficult. In tort, a plaintiff can ask for past and future lost wages or
diminished earning capacity. DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 81, at 214. Past and future wages are
relatively easy to prove. The plaintiff must show the lost wages or lost business earnings during
the period impacted by the injury and in the future period the injury is anticipated to impact. Id.
Diminished earning capacity “measures the victim’s lost potential to earn income because of the
injury and is not dependent on proof that the victim had exploited, or would in the future exploit,
that capacity.” Id. In essence, the plaintiff is compensated “for an injury which deprives him of
his opportunity to use his time as he so chooses.” Id. The plaintiff must use the prevailing
workplace compensation rates and prove his/her specific ability, skills, aptitude for a career path
prior to the injury, educational attainment, and prior employment history (if it exists) in order to
receive damages for diminished earning capacity. Id. If the plaintiff is awarded a lump sum, the
damages must be reduced to their “present value” which must reflect “the interest the plaintiff
can earn on the advance transfer of money for future losses in income.” Id. at 215. Since pain
and suffering damages have no monetary equivalent like lost wages and income, proof of pain
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jury deliberations when the jury assigns fault (if multiple defendants are
involved) and awards the total amount of damages owed. The standards set by
the criminal courts in proving damages during the restitution phase of
sentencing should be changed to reflect the standards set by the courts in civil
trials as they pertain to damage calculations. Defendants should have the right
to confront the victim’s expert witnesses who have assigned these loss
calculation figures at a restitution hearing.104 Defendants should also be given
the opportunity to provide their own experts, such as an economist, vocational
expert, or psychiatrist, to dispute the total amount of damages suffered by the
victim.105 Arbitrary figures alleged for non-pecuniary losses, such as pain and
suffering and other variations of mental distress, should be questioned just as
they are in civil courts. Similar to bifurcation in criminal trials, in which the
asset forfeiture phase is put forth after the jury finds the defendant guilty, so too
and suffering is “highly dependent on proof that the victim is or was during his life conscious of
his injuries and the negative implications of those injuries.” Id. at 216.
104. In fact, one could argue it may be a violation of the United States Constitution’s Sixth
Amendment right of Confrontation if they are not given the opportunity to cross examine these
expert witnesses during a restitution hearing. But see United States v. Young, 981 F.2d 180, 187
(5th Cir. 1993) (“At sentencing, due process merely requires that information relied on in
determining an appropriate sentence have ‘some minimal indicia of reliability.’” (quoting United
States v. Galvan, 949 F.2d 777, 784 (5th Cir. 1991))). If restitution is considered a criminal
penalty, questions regarding the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial are raised. The Supreme
Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and the Fifth Amendment right to due
process require that “[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a
sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury
verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 490 (2000). Judges must determine that “restitution does not constitute a criminal sanction”
or that the “restitution statutes fail to set the ‘statutory maximum’ necessary to trigger Apprendi
concerns” in order to avoid any Sixth Amendment right to jury trial violation. CHARLES DOYLE,
CONG. RESEARCH. SERV. RL 34138, RESTITUTION IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES 5-6 (2007).
105. Defendants may be able to argue an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the
Sixth Amendment if defense counsel is unable or unwilling to provide the defendant with the
opportunity to have his own economist or psychiatrist/psychologist review the victim’s loss
calculations prior to being ordered to pay millions of dollars to the victim. A defendant’s request
for expert funds was denied without prejudice in United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781,
784 n.5 (E.D. Tex. 2009). Defense attorneys often receive the victim’s claims shortly before the
hearing and are ill-prepared to address restitution concerns. In a perfect world, the probation
officer, who is required to prepare a report identifying each victim of the offense and the extent
of their injuries, damages, or losses, receives information from the government no “later than 60
days prior to the date initially set for sentencing.” 18 U.S.C. 3664(d)(1) (2006). However, if the
government is unable to consult with all identified victims during this sixty-day period and the
victims submit their affidavits outside the sixty-day period, defense counsel likely will not have
the time to investigate loss amounts and find their own expert witnesses in time for sentencing.
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should the restitution portion of the trial begin after the defendant’s guilt is
determined. Civil courts often bifurcate the trials, requiring the jury to
determine whether the plaintiff has established causation before the plaintiff is
able to present evidence on actual damages.
As the law currently stands, “[a]ny dispute as to the property amount or
type of restitution shall be resolved by the court by the preponderance of
the evidence standard.”106 The government must bear the burden of proof
with respect to loss amount, the defense must bear the burden of proof with
respect to the ability to pay, and the court must assign the burdens with
respect to other disputed matters as it deems appropriate.107 Even though
the defendant bears the burden with respect to his ability to pay, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3664(f)(1)(A) is clear that the court should order full restitution without
regard to the financial circumstances of the defendant.108 Initially, this
requirement would seem unfair to the defendant who may be unable to pay
a victim millions of dollars—however, the focus of restitution is on making
the victim “whole.”109 If the defendant is ordered to pay the victim’s full
amount of damages, it is in the defendant’s best interest to request that the
judge assign fault so that the defendant may later seek contribution from
other defendants (past, present, and future) in order to be fully
compensated. Title 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5) also requires that the court not
take into account the fact that a victim may have been compensated by

106. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e).
107. Id. The government bears the burden of proving: (1) that a person or entity is a
victim for purposes of restitution and (2) the amount of loss. United States v. Waknine, 543
F.3d 546, 555 (9th Cir. 2008).
108. United States v. Senty-Haugen, 449 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 133 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted); United States v.
Sosebee, 419 F.3d 451, 460 (6th Cir. 2005). The statute most likely requires the defendant
to prove his or her ability to pay so that the court can consider the defendant’s assets,
anticipated future income, and other financial obligations in its calculation of the manner and
schedule of restitution payment for each victim. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2). For example, in
Staples, the court ordered that
[u]pon release from incarceration, the defendant shall pay restitution at the rate
of 10% of monthly gross earnings, until such time as the court may alter that
payment schedule. These payments do not preclude the government from using
other assets or income of the defendant to satisfy his restitution obligation.
United States v. Staples, No. 09-14017-CR, 2009 WL 2827204, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2,
2009). Compensation may be made in lump sum payments, partial payments, in-kind
payments (such as replacements costs), or nominal periodic payments. 18 U.S.C. §
3664(f)(3)(A), (B).
109. United States v. Staples, No. 09-14017-CR, 2009 WL 2827204 at *4.
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insurance “or any other source.”110 In torts, this collateral source rule is
somewhat controversial.111 Placing a collateral source rule in the criminal
restitution context is rather harsh—if the victim receives compensation
from other possessors of her images or from other distributors or the actual
producer of the images, the victim’s award against the defendant in the
particular case should be trimmed by the amount of these collateral
payments. Reduction of damages to the particular defendant will not create
a “systematic underdeterrence” for possessors of child pornography, which
is the underlying reason behind the collateral source rule.112
2. Conclusions
Courts must ensure that these damage figures are fully supported by the
record. Some of the practical difficulties include: whether the defendant
should be permitted to take the deposition of the victim to see what she says
about “losses;” whether the defendant should be permitted to require the
victim to submit to an examination by experts of the defendant’s choosing;
whether the defendant should be permitted to interview the victim, perhaps
by telephone, regarding losses; whether the defendant should be permitted
to learn the location and true identity of the victim; whether the defendant
should be able to hire CPAs, financial experts, psychologists, psychiatrists,
and vocational experts at the government’s expense in order to challenge
the victim’s affidavit and present affirmative proof on behalf of the
offender; and whether the defendant should be able to challenge the
“reasonableness” of any of the listed losses in § 2259.
Courts should hold restitution hearings separately from the guilt or
sentencing phase of the case. Defense attorneys would have enough time to
counter the victim’s loss calculations (if they need time to review the
victim’s calculations) and to rebut the victim’s evidence with expert
110. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(B). However, 18 U.S.C. § 3664(j)(2) states that
[a]ny amount paid to a victim under an order of restitution shall be reduced by
any amount later recovered as compensatory damages for the same loss by the
victim in – (A) any Federal civil proceeding; and (B) any State civil
proceeding, to the extent provided by the law of the State.
Id. § 3664(j)(2).
111. “Numerous reform statutes . . . reject the collateral source rule and allow the jury to
consider such insurance payouts and deduct them from the defendant’s liability.” See
DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 81, at 223. Some reform statutes, such as section 4545(c) of the
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, allow collateral source admissibility without
indicating what role such evidence should play in the jury’s deliberations. N.Y. C.P.L.R. §
4545(c) (McKinney 2009).
112. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 450 (1999).
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witnesses of their own. Yet, a defendant’s need to rebut a victim’s
assertions must be balanced with the need for judicial efficiency. A
bifurcated sentencing hearing split into a sentencing and restitution phase
cannot be far apart. Judges are under considerable time pressure to
conclude these matters in one short hearing and are required to announce
the restitution order from the bench at the end of the hearing and then later
enter a Judgment and Commitment Order that includes the restitution order.
If the defendant went to trial, judges should consider allowing juries to
determine damages in the criminal restitution context (after the defendant is
found guilty at trial), just as juries are held to be competent to determine
damages in civil suits or asset forfeiture decisions in criminal trials. These
options might answer many of the practical difficulties listed above, but
would also devote a larger, more burdensome amount of time and expense
on the government and the court system and subject the victim to greater
scrutiny.
E. What Are the Due Process Concerns When Imposing a § 2259
Restitution Order?
1. Due Process Issues Identified
Several defendants in § 2259 restitution cases have argued that the
amount of restitution imposed violated the Eighth Amendment’s excessive
fines clause and also violated their due process rights as they had not been
made aware that they may be subject to restitution at the time they pled
guilty.113
The second argument is much easier to resolve than the first. The
Supreme Court has stated that a defendant must be “aware of the
consequences of his plea.”114 But a variance from the specified Rule 11
procedures constitutes harmless error if it does not affect the defendant’s
substantial rights.115 If the court’s failure to advise the defendant of the
113. United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 616 (W.D. Pa. 2010); United States v.
Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d 182, 188 n.5 (D. Me. 2009); United States v. Van Brackle, No. 2:08CR-042-WCO, 2009 WL 4928050 at *3 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 2009); United States v. Wilk,
No. 04-60216-CR, 2007 WL 2263942, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 6, 2007) (arguing that the
forfeiture of the defendant’s house, after finding it to have been used to commit or promote
the possession of child pornography, was excessive and grossly disproportionate to the
offense of child pornography possession).
114. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 464 (1969).
115. United States v. Rogers, 984 F.2d 314, 318 (9th Cir. 1993) (remanding to district
court to decide whether the interests of justice would be better served by resentencing
without restitution or by offering the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea).

686

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:653

possibility of restitution at the time of the plea colloquy was deemed to
affect the defendant’s “substantial rights,” and was not, in fact, a simple
variance, the court can still cure any defect from the Rule 11 plea colloquy
by informing the defendant of the court’s restitution authority and offering
the defendant the opportunity to withdraw the plea and go to trial.116
As to the first argument set forth by the defendant, the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the imposition of “excessive fines”117 and “limits the
government’s power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, ‘as
punishment for some offense.’”118 The question becomes whether the fine
is “grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.”119
Courts must evaluate the statutory maximum fine, the defendant’s level of
culpability, and the actual harm caused by the defendant’s conduct in
determining whether the fine bears some relationship to the offense.120
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Dubose121 found that restitution
ordered pursuant to the MVRA, under 18 U.S.C. § 3664, did not violate the
Eighth Amendment because it was “geared directly to the amount of the
victim’s loss caused by the defendant’s illegal activity.”122 Again,
proximate cause rears its head in the Eighth Amendment context. While
defendants may argue that the victim’s recoverable losses should be limited
to those proximately caused by the offense of conviction (that is, limited to
the mere possession of the victim’s images in the particular case at issue or
else the award may face Eighth Amendment excessive fine concerns), the
total injury to the victim is indivisible and, therefore, it is practically
impossible to make an individualized inquiry into the amount of losses
116. Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252 and 2252A, possession, distribution, and receipt of child
pornography, the court is authorized to order restitution in an amount up to the statutory
maximum fine of $250,000 under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3571(b)(3) or the maximum guideline fine,
which is $250,000 at U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(c)(3).
117. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
118. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 328 (1998) (internal quotes omitted).
119. Id. at 334, 337.
120. Id. at 338-40. As previously described, the statutory penalties for possession of an
image of child pornography in violation of section 2252A(a)(5)(B) include imprisonment for
not more than ten years for a first offense, a fine of $250,000, or both, and not more than
three years of supervised release. The advisory sentencing guidelines group counts of
possession of child pornography and aggregate images to generate an offense level and
sentencing range. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2G2.2(b)(7), 3D1.2(d)
(2011). Restitution may be disproportionate when viewed in relation to the applicable
statutory penalties and advisory sentencing guidelines’ range.
121. 146 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 1998).
122. Id. at 1144; see also United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 205-06 (3d Cir. 2007);
United States v. Newsome, 322 F.3d 328, 342 (4th Cir. 2003).
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proximately caused by the defendant’s conduct. The best workable solution
is for the judge to apportion fault (albeit somewhat arbitrarily)123 so that the
defendant (or victim) might later seek contribution from other
defendants.124
2. Conclusions
A § 2259 restitution order issued to a possessor of child pornography,
which takes into account the victim’s entire loss can become so large and
overwhelming for the defendant that the damages awarded begin to look
less like compensatory damages, which are meant as restitution for harm
sustained by the victim,125 and more like a criminal fine or punitive
damages designed to punish and deter particularly egregious conduct.126
Extremely large restitution amounts may make it difficult for possessors to
later assimilate into society and have any chance at rehabilitation since they
are now burdened with exorbitant restitution claims which may defy the
defendant’s ability to pay. And despite the fact that the United States
abolished federal imprisonment for unpaid debts in 1833, debtor’s prison
could become a reality.127 Restitution amounts cannot be discharged in
123. See infra Part III.
124. Although, under §§ 3663 and 3664, restitution, by definition, demands that it be
exactly proportionate to the harm caused by the offense. See United States v. Beydoun, 469
F.3d 102, 107 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Boccagna, 450 F.3d 107, 117 (2d Cir. 2006);
United States v. Gordon, 393 F.3d 1044, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Dawson, 250
F.3d 1048, 1050 (7th Cir. 2001).
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903.
126. Id. § 908. “Courts in most states award punitive damages against defendants who
act with malice.” DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 81, at 218. Have the possessors of child
pornography acted with malice or at least shown a reckless disregard towards a victim’s
rights to justify punitive damages?
127. Editorial, Timeline: A Brief History of Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2005,
http://select.nytimes.com/2005/11/16/opinion/15talking.timeline.html?_r=1.
Imprisoning
individuals for unpaid debts was common during both ancient Greek and Roman rule and in
the Middle Ages. Id. American Revolutionary war hero and father of Robert E. Lee, Henry
“Lighthorse Harry” Lee III, was imprisoned for unpaid debts between 1808 and 1809.
Henry “Light-Horse Harry” Lee, THE ROBINSON LIBR., http://www.robinsonlibrary.com/
america/unitedstates/1775/biography/lee-h.htm (last updated Nov. 25, 2011). With the rise
in borrowers who are behind in paying off their credit card bills, auto loans, mortgage
payments, and other bills, arrest warrants are now being issued “if a borrower defies a court
order to repay a debt or doesn’t show up in court.” Jessica Silver Greenberg, Welcome to
Debtors’ Prison, 2011 Edition, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704396504576204553811636610.html. “Retailers, credit-card issuers,
landlords and debt collectors are the most frequent seekers of such orders, according to court
filings and interviews with judges and lawyers.” Id.
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bankruptcy.128 Any criminal monetary penalties ordered at sentencing must
be paid and enforced immediately unless otherwise ordered by the judge.129
It is entirely possible that if the defendant does not fully pay restitution, the
defendant may be held in contempt of court and sentenced to additional
time for not complying with the court’s order.130 The United States may
also file liens on the defendant’s properties, and have rights to all of the
defendant’s properties and assets.131
The goal of restitution should be to find a balance between the desire to
make the victim “whole” and the desire to provide the defendant with a
chance at rehabilitation in the future.132 With the ability to seek
contribution, a defendant may be able to recover some of his losses from
other possessors, distributors, and producers. However, this may become
much more complicated as more and more victims begin to make their own
restitution claims, and defendants have scarce funds to go after co-

128. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (2010); United States v. Pepper, 51 F.3d 469, 473-74 (5th Cir.
1995) (citing Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 50 (1986)).
129. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 120, § 3E1.1, cmt. n.1(c).
130. Ahern v. Ahern, 15 S.W.3d 73, 79 (Tenn. 2000) (“After a finding of contempt,
courts have several remedies available depending upon the facts of the case. A court can
imprison an individual to compel performance of a court order. This is typically referred to
as ‘civil contempt.’ This remedy is available only when the individual has the ability to
comply with the order at the time of the contempt hearing. Thus, with civil contempt, the
one in contempt has the ‘keys to the jail’ and can purge the contempt by complying with the
court's order. In civil contempt, the imprisonment is meted out for the benefit of a party
litigant. A court can also imprison and/or fine an individual simply as punishment for the
contempt. This remedy is commonly referred to as ‘criminal contempt.’ Unless otherwise
provided, the circuit, chancery, and appellate courts are limited to imposing a fine of $50.00
and to imprisoning an individual for not more than ten days. A party who is in criminal
contempt cannot be freed by eventual compliance.” (internal citations omitted)).
131. 18 U.S.C. § 3613(C) (2011).
132. In the civil context,
[t]he rules of tort law are intended to achieve some uneasy balance between
justice and efficiency. . . . From the vantage of corrective justice, damage
awards function as a form of redress. Set the damages too low and P is not
made whole even if liability is established; set them too high and D is forced to
pay for losses he did not cause. The central legal task is first to choose and
then to apply a legal rule that avoids these twin perils. . . . Set that award too
low and D will consume too many of P’s resources for his own benefit. Set
that award too high and D will spend too many resources to avoid harms to
others. Making accurate damage calculations is critical under both negligence
and strict liability regimes in order to make D’s private costs align with the
social costs of his actions.
EPSTEIN, supra note 112, at 435-36.
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defendants.133 Defendants will face not only a claim from one or two
victims but possibly claims from multiple victims seeking hundreds of
thousands or millions of dollars each. The task of seeking “contribution”
by one possessor against another, by one defendant against another, may
become overwhelming and seemingly unworkable.
III. Proposed Solution: Apportioning Fault in Child Pornography
Possession Cases
The various arguments facing judges regarding the matters discussed
above are all issues which need to be identified and addressed when
apportioning fault in child pornography possession cases. If the injury to
the victim is indivisible, just as in tort law, the defendant is jointly and
severally liable for the full amount of damages. Each defendant has
contributed to the single result—the victim’s fear, shame, and humiliation
in the face of sexual abuse and repeated victimization each time the image
is viewed. Joint and several liability protects the victim from being
undercompensated. However, in order to avoid unfair treatment of a
defendant who is the mere possessor of child pornography images, a judge
should take into consideration the totality of damages done to the victim
along with the number of identified and unidentified offenders, and
apportion fault based on a reasonable assumption of individual culpability.
Apportionment will prove to be difficult in these cases—usually one
defendant convicted of child pornography possession out of hundreds is
before that particular judge. How can a judge apportion fault when there
are future defendants who have not yet viewed the victim’s images, or
defendants who will never be identified or prosecuted? Thus, the fault
percentages based on the number of prospective defenders will randomly
change as future offenders are identified. In the context of illegal drug
133. According to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC),
the “volume of apparent child pornography images seized by law enforcement and sent to
NCMEC for review continues to grow dramatically . . . [yet] the number of child victims
who are identified remains relatively small.” Brief of NCMEC at 4-5, United States v.
Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781 (E.D. Tex., 2009) (No. 6:08-CR-61). “Of these identified
children, 89% are located in the United States and 11% are located outside the United States.
Id. at 5. However, since the victims have only recently begun seeking restitution from
possessors of child pornography and have begun to receive significantly high damage
awards, it is reasonable to assume the amount of victims requesting restitution will rise.
These high damage awards also encourage attorneys to seek out victims of child
pornography in order to find deep-pocket defendants who may be able to pay the full amount
of damages (including attorney’s fees).
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prosecutions, the fault percentages can be quantified and tallied quite easily.
If an innocent child happens upon some toxic cocaine being sold by a street
dealer in Minnesota, and the child ingests it, and is permanently harmed by
it,134 the fault could be apportioned amongst the manufacturer at the cocaine
lab, the Colombian trafficker who purchased it and sold it in Mexico, the
Mexican trafficker who purchased it and transported it to Denver,
Colorado,135 the distributor in Colorado who transported it to Minnesota,
and the dealer who divided up the cocaine and sold it in small quantities on
the street. If each individual’s fault was determined based upon the profits
they made in the selling of the illegal drugs (and for simplicity’s sake, the
profits were based on the purchase of one kilogram of cocaine), the
percentages would be as follows: the manufacturer at the lab would be
liable for 0.5%, the Colombian trafficker 2%, the Mexican trafficker 47.5%,
the Denver distributor 25%, and the Minnesota street dealer 25%.136
Therefore, if the child victim’s total medical expenses, therapy, lost income,
etc. totals one million dollars—each defendant is liable for the one million
but may seek contribution from the other defendants not before the court.
Not only do these percentages take into account the amount of profits each
individual earned on the drug deal, but the amount of profit (and
percentage) correlated to the amount of risk each individual assumed in
transporting the illegal substance to its final destination. If the street dealer
sells to ten end-users, he assumes great risk and receives a larger amount of
profit because it is likely those ten individuals, if eventually caught by law
enforcement with the drugs, may incriminate the dealer in Minnesota. The
Mexican trafficker also assumes a greater risk of getting caught crossing the
Mexico-United States border with cocaine than the Colombian trafficker

134. To make this example as similar as possible to § 2259, the victim must be innocent.
An end-user, drug addict, may be held partially liable for creating demand for the drug in the
first place. This scenario could be just as effective if an innocent child in Minnesota was
killed in a drug-related gun battle between two rival gangs.
135. Denver, Colorado is considered a known drug source city in the United States. See
Colorado Drug Threat Assessment, NAT’L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR., http://www.justice.
gov/ndic/pubs4/4300/cocaine.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2011).
136. The percentages of fault are based upon illegal cocaine prices commonly known by
Drug Enforcement Administration agents. See generally MATTHEW B. ROBINSON & RENEE
G. SCHERLEN, LIES, DAMNED LIES, AND DRUG WAR STATISTICS 107 (2007). Generally, one
kilogram of cocaine sells for $1000 in Colombia, $5000 in Mexico next to the U.S. border,
$20,000 in Denver, $30,000 in Minnesota, and $40,000 on the street in Minnesota if the
street dealer sells ten packets of 100 grams each for $4000 each. Id.
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who needs only to send the cocaine to Mexico where there is little law
enforcement presence compared to the United States.137
Profits associated with child pornography images are much more
difficult to determine. It is common knowledge that several internet sites
exist in which users barter and trade one image for another rather than pay
for the images, thereby creating an even greater demand for new images to
replenish the supply so that the users can keep trading.138 If fault is to be
apportioned, it seems fair to suggest that producers are the most culpable
and should shoulder at least 50% of the liability, with distributors and
redistributors a close second at 25%, and possessors, the least culpable
between 25% to 1% (depending upon the amount of images found in his
possession).139 Within the categories, those who possess thousands of
images should also be apportioned more of the fault as opposed to those
who possess only a few images.
Since the images can be reproduced indefinitely, the scenario is similar to
lawsuits in which music producers under the Recording Industry Association
of America (RIAA) sued companies such as LimeWire for copyright
infringement. Websites encouraged users to share their music files on
LimeWire, which took profits away from musicians, record labels, and
producers associated with RIAA.140 If the court apportioned fault, end users
of the website would be responsible for a small percentage of the total amount
of damages to RIAA whereas LimeWire, the storer and distributor of the
songs, would be responsible for a greater amount of the damages. The task of
apportioning fault for a victim’s total loss for injuries suffered from child
pornography among all offenders may be difficult and arbitrary. It may
appear arbitrary to assign 50% of the fault to the producer, 25% to distributors,
and 25-1% to each possessor, but at least a defendant would then have the
ability to recover some of the losses paid to the victim if the judge issued a full
restitution order against the only defendant charged and prosecuted in court.141
137. See Randal C. Archibold, Bit by Bit, a Mexican Police Force Is Eradicated, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/12/world/americas/12mexico.html.
138. See MONIQUE MATTEI FERRARO, EOGHAN CASEY & MICHAEL MCGRATH,
INVESTIGATING CHILD EXPLOITATION AND PORNOGRAPHY: THE INTERNET, THE LAW AND
FORENSIC SCIENCE 73 (2005): Troy Stabenow, A Method for Case Study: A Proposal for
Reforming the Child Pornography Guidelines, 24 FED. SENT. R. 108, 116 (2011).
139. These apportionments are simply for the sake of argument and could easily be
adjusted up or down in a given case.
140. Thomas Mennecke, LimeWire Sued by the RIAA, SLYCK, Aug. 4, 2006, http://www.
slyck.com/story1258_LimeWire_Sued_by_the_RIAA.
141. The obvious difference between these examples and the possessory child
pornography cases is the focus on profits lost compared to losses suffered by the victim.
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Some courts have devised their own apportionment formulas by dividing
defendants into categories, assigning a percentage of damages to each
category,142 and creating a formula for determining restitution amounts by
utilizing the civil remedies section which Congress made available to
victims of § 2252 violations.143 Section 2255 states that a victim of sexual
exploitation “shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than
$150,000 in value.”144 Courts have set 2% of $150,000 as the amount of
harm caused by a possessor of child pornography, and have determined that
However, as previously discussed, personal losses suffered in most crimes (such as in a gang
rape or kidnapping situation with multiple defendants) are easy to determine since most of
the co-defendants are finite and identified. In the drug and copyright examples, the codefendants are much more difficult to identify and therefore, similar to these child
pornography cases in that particular instance.
142. United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1266 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Aguirre II, No. 1:08-CR-434 AWI, 2010 WL 1328819, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2010);
United States v. Scheidt, No. 1:07-CR-00293 AWI, 2010 WL 144837, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan.
11, 2010); United States v. Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d 182 (E.D. Tex. 2009); United States v.
Ferenci, No. 1:08-CR-0414 AWI, 2009 WL 2579102, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009);
United States v. Renga, No. 1:08-CR-0270 AWI, 2009 WL 2579103, at *5-6 (E.D. Cal.
Aug. 19, 2009); United States v. Zane, No. 1:08-CR-0369 AWI, 2009 WL 2567832, at *4-5
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2009); United States v. Monk, No. 1:08-CR-0365 AWI, 2009 WL
2567831, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2009). Defendants have been divided among those who
produced and/or transmitted the images, those who possessed images, and those who
possessed and transmitted images.
143. See United States v. Lindauer, No. 3:10-cr-00023, 2011 WL 1225992, at *4 (W.D.
Va. Mar. 30, 2011); United States v. Stowers, No. CR-10-74-JHP, 2011 WL 3022188, at *4
n.15 (E.D. Okla. Jul. 22, 2011); United States v. Brannon, No. 2:09cr19, 2011 WL 251168,
at *3 (W.D. N.C. Jan. 26, 2011); United States v. Mather, No. 1:09-CR-00412 AWI, 2010
WL 5173029, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2010); Aguirre II, 2010 WL 1328819 at *4; United
States v. Brunner, No. 5:08cr16, 2010 WL 148433, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 2010); Scheidt,
2010 WL 144837 at *5; United States v. Baxter, 394 F. App’x. 377, 379 (9th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Hicks, No. 1:09-CR-150, 2009 WL 4110260, at *6 n.10 (E.D. Va. Nov. 24,
2009); Renga, 2009 WL 2579103 at *5; Monk, 2009 WL 2567831 at *4-5; Zane, 2009 WL
2567832 at *5. Title 18 U.S.C. § 2255 states that
[a]ny person who, while a minor, was a victim of a violation of section 2241(c),
2242 [sexual abuse], 2243 [sexual abuse], 2251, 2251A [selling children for
purposes of sexually explicit conduct], 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or
2423 of this title and who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation,
regardless of whether the injury occurred while such person was a minor, may
sue in any appropriate United States District Court and shall recover the actual
damages such person sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorney’s fee. Any person as described in the preceding sentence shall be
deemed to have sustained damages of no less than $150,000 in value.
18 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006).
144. 18 U.S.C. § 2255.
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$3000 was found to be a reasonable apportionment of liability pursuant to
18 U.S.C. §§ 3664(h) and 2259.145 Courts reason that Congress was aware
that victims would have a difficult time proving the exact amount of
damages a particular possessor or distributor caused, and therefore,
Congress set forth $150,000 as the minimum amount the victim suffered.146
The civil remedy in § 2255 is separate from criminal restitution, yet
“[c]rimes and torts frequently overlap. . . . The [Mandatory Victims
Restitution] Act enables the tort victim to recover his damages in a
summary proceeding ancillary to a criminal prosecution.”147 While the civil
remedy statute may be of some use to judges in determining the victim’s
damage, setting the damages at $150,000 is much more arbitrary than
determining the victim’s full amount of losses and apportioning the
defendant’s fault and proportionate share of liability.
Lastly, if victims are allowed to file the same restitution claims in
various federal jurisdictions throughout the United States, this creates the
possibility of dual recovery. How is it possible or justifiable for a victims’
attorney to claim the same amount of attorney fees, medical expenses, lost
incomes, in multiple jurisdictions for the same offense, the same type of
possession case? In a civil proceeding, once a jury determines damages, the
plaintiff may then recover from the defendants in the case. While those
same defendants may not be the only individuals who caused the harm, it is
well settled that the plaintiff may not sue for the identical damages in a
separate case. The original defendants and non-parties not before the court
but identified in the civil trial are responsible for the plaintiff’s damages
and these defendants can seek contribution from those parties complicit in
the offense. Thus, the plaintiff presents her evidence of damages to the
court only once and can recover only once. Similarly, in the criminal
restitution context, the victim/petitioner should only present her evidence of
145. This amount is two percent of the $150,000 amount reflected in Section 2255.
Given the high amount of the deemed damages in Section 2255, the court finds an amount
less than $3000 inconsistent with Congress’s findings on the harm to children victims of
child pornography. At the same time, the court finds $3000 is a level of restitution that the
court is confident is somewhat less than the actual harm this particular defendant caused
each victim, resolving any due process concerns. Monk, 2009 WL 2567831 at *5.
146. Id.
147. United States v. Bach, 172 F.3d 520, 523 (7th Cir. 1999); see also United States v.
Duncan, 870 F.2d 1532, 1539 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding no abuse of discretion in the district
court’s deferral to judgment in the civil suit in determining the proper amount of restitution
where the amount of compensatory damages sought in the civil suit, which covered the same
acts of wrongdoing as stated in the criminal restitution order, was no greater than the amount
alleged by the government in connection with the criminal offense).
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loss once, and in each subsequent case, the federal district court judge
should give “full faith and credit”148 to the restitution amount given to the
victim in the previous federal case. In this sense, the difficult task of
determining damages has already been decided, and it is the current judge’s
sole task to determine how to apportion fault as it pertains to the particular
defendant before him. This would prevent dual recovery by the victim and
limit the wide array of restitution awards from decisions made by multiple
federal district court judges in different federal jurisdictions.
Child pornography possession cases are unique. The victim must
confront an unknown number of co-defendants, and most defendants lack
the resources to seek contribution from other future co-defendants. The
author proposes that: (1) the full amount of restitution owed to a particular
victim should be determined when the victim first requests restitution, and
the amount should be fixed after the first case is adjudicated; (2) the judge
in future cases pertaining to the same victim should apportion fault and
liability to the particular defendant appearing before his court based on the
earlier total restitution amount as determined by the initial court; (3) the
judge should issue a restitution order based upon the apportioned liability;
(4) victims are then permitted to seek the rest of the restitution damages not
fully recovered during the first criminal case during successive criminal
trials, until the full amount of damages are satisfied; and (5) once that
restitution award is satisfied, if the victim feels re-victimized by additional
viewings that occurs after the original restitution was requested, the victim
must petition the court and allege additional losses before seeking
additional award amounts.
These recommendations appear to place a greater burden on the victim
(plaintiff) to recover the full amount of restitution from individual defendants,
whereas in a civil trial the defendant oftentimes is held liable for all losses and
it is incumbent upon the defendant to seek recovery from other coconspirators or offenders. However, in child pornography possession cases, it
is the victim that receives information from prosecutors any time his/her
image is viewed and there is a pending criminal prosecution. A victim is
notified that a possessor of their child pornography image has been identified
and charged with a criminal offense. The victim is in a better position to seek
full restitution through future apportioned contributions by other as-yetunidentified defenders in subsequent trials before other courts than is the
148. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof.”).

2012]

WHEN DOES RESTITUTION BECOME RETRIBUTION?

695

defendant in this particular case because they know which image was
distributed. Moreover, the defendant is not the typical civil defendant with a
significant cushion to handle severe financial loss and ability to seek
contribution from known co-defendants. These recommendations, which
center on fault apportionment, would also preclude victims’ attorneys from
cherry picking wealthy defendants in an effort to seek full restitution from
defendants who are least culpable but have the deepest pockets. If a defendant
of a child pornography possession case has no money, and yet the defendant is
held liable for full restitution to a victim, it seems that both the defendant and
the victim lose. The victim will receive little or no money from a defendant
who faces years in prison and has only a depleted bank account as his sole
asset; the defendant, in turn, will have a blighted future when released from
incarceration with an unimaginable financial obligation. It is more fair and
equitable for both parties to have full restitution determined by the court
during the first criminal trial, and the defendant ordered to pay only his
apportioned amount of the “total loss” suffered by the victim. The victim can
then seek future contributions towards full restitution from other defendants as
future offenders are identified and held accountable for their crimes.
IV. Conclusion
Congress has provided little insight into how the court should determine
restitution under § 2259. Section 2259 ambiguously defines the term “full
amount of the victim’s losses” and refers the reader to the MVRA’s § 3664’s
sparse procedures to be used for the issuance and enforcement of the order of
restitution; neither section provides guidance on how precisely to determine
the amount subject to restitution. Section 2259 should be amended to provide
more guidance to judges in how to determine restitution amounts and how to
fairly apportion fault in the child pornography context.
These amendments should provide some flexibility and discretion for
judges to deviate from said guidelines when creating restitution orders; but a
suitable standard must be established. Restitution orders should, at times, be
permissibly decreased based on due process rights under the Eighth
Amendment; otherwise, restitution orders may appear to be additional forms
of punishment rather than attempts to make the victim “whole.” The
defendant should have the right to a restitution hearing and the right to
question the evidence presented and cross-examine the expert witnesses at the
hearing. The defendant’s ability or inability to pay should be taken into
account when apportioning fault (as the court does in bank robbery cases).
Lawyers involved in the restitution process should be educated on the
relationship between restitution and tort law. While the defendant cannot
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negate the prima facie evidence of multiple child pornography images found
on his/her computer, defense counsel can, at least, attempt to limit the
defendant’s amount of financial exposure at sentencing if made aware of
restitution claims in advance. Defense attorneys should have the ability to
question the financial damages proffered or claimed by the victim’s lawyer.
Restitution amounts should be subject to discovery prior to sentencing.
A defendant’s liability should be apportioned at the restitution hearing,
and the defendant should only be responsible to pay the victim his portion
of liability. The victim is in the best position to seek contribution from
other co-defendants and to include those who may be prosecuted in the
future. If this does not occur, excessive restitution amounts will make it
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for possessors to compensate the
victim. The current law, as it stands, encourages attorneys to seek out
victims in order to find deep-pocket defendants who are then forced to pay
all the damages when their true liability is nominal. If victims are allowed
to present their case for damages only once, with the understanding that the
prevailing judge will determine the full restitution amount and the
apportionment of liability for all defendants, then this binding decision
would preclude plaintiffs and their attorneys from taking a second, third,
and fourth bite of the apple in other federal jurisdictions.
As the Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section of the Department of
Justice has stated,
Producing child abuse images has now become easy and
inexpensive. The Internet allows images and digitized movies to
be reproduced and disseminated to tens of thousands of
individuals at the click of a button. . . . The technological ease,
lack of expense, and anonymity in obtaining and distributing
child pornography has resulted in an explosion in the
availability, accessibility, and volume of child pornography.149
Congress may have gone a bit overboard in attempting to deter child
pornography with the creation of the § 2259 restitution statute. A
“reasonable determination”150 of restitution must be made—one that keeps
both the victim and the defendant in mind.

149. Child Pornography, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/child
porn.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2012).
150. United States v. Innarelli, 524 F.3d 286, 294 (1st Cir. 2008) (finding that the court
must make a “reasonable determination” of restitution not merely a “rough approximation”).

